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AUGUST 2016 – AUGUST 2017: CASE LAW ON
AMERICAN INDIANS
By Thomas P. Schlosser
I. UNITED STATE SUPREME COURT
1.

Lewis v. Clarke

No. 15–1500, 2017 WL 1447161, 137 S. Ct. 1285 (U.S. Apr. 25,
2017). Motor vehicle driver and passenger brought action against
Indian tribe member in his individual capacity, alleging that
member's negligence in driving tribe-owned limousine carrying
patrons of tribe-owned casino caused off-reservation motor vehicle
accident on interstate freeway. The Connecticut Superior Court,
2014 WL 5354956, denied member's motion to dismiss based on
tribal sovereign immunity. Member appealed. The Connecticut
Supreme Court, 320 Conn. 706, 135 A.3d 677, reversed and
remanded with directions. Certiorari was granted. The Supreme
Court held that: (1) tribe member was the real party in interest in
the suit brought against him in his individual capacity, and thus,
tribe member was not entitled to tribal sovereign immunity, and
(2) Indian tribe's indemnification statute for its employees did not
make the tribe the real party in interest, as would support tribal
sovereign immunity. Reversed and remanded.
2.

Patchak v. Zinke

No. 16–498, Cert Granted 137 S. Ct. 2091, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 2894
(May 1, 2017). Case Below: Patchak v. Jewell, No. 15-5200, 828
F.3d 995, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 12984 (D.D.C. July 15, 2016).
Petition for writ of certiorari granted limited to Question 1 of the
petition, “Does a statute directing the federal courts to ‘promptly
dismiss’ a pending lawsuit following substantive determinations by
the court (including this Court’s determination that the suit ‘may
proceed’) – without amending underlying substantive or procedural
laws – violate the Constitution’s separation of powers principles?”
David Patchak brought this suit under the Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 705, challenging the authority of the
Department of the Interior to take title to a particular tract of land
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under the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), 25 U.S.C. § 465. The
land, called the Bradley Property, had been put into trust for the use
of the Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians in
Michigan, otherwise known as the Gun Lake Band or the Gun Lake
Tribe. Following the Supreme Court’s determination in 2012 that
Mr. Patchak had prudential standing to bring this lawsuit, see
Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v.
Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199, 2212, 183 L. Ed. 2d 211 (2012), Congress
passed the Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act, Pub. L. No.
113-179, 128 Stat. 1913 (2014), a stand-alone statute reaffirming the
Department of the Interior’s decision to take the land in question
into trust for the Gun Lake Tribe, and removing jurisdiction from
the federal courts over any actions relating to that property. The
District Court determined on summary judgment that it was stripped
of its jurisdiction to consider Mr. Patchak’s claim. Holding
additionally that the Act was not constitutionally infirm, the District
Court dismissed the case. The Court of Appeals held that:
(1) Appellant landowner’s suit contesting appellee Department of
the Interior’s taking of land in trust for appellee tribe failed because
the Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act, Pub. L. No. 113-179,
128 Stat. 1913 (2014), permissibly removed federal jurisdiction, as
the Act constitutionally exercised Congress’s power to legislate as
to Indian tribes; (2) The Act did not violate the landowner’s right to
petition because Congress could withhold federal jurisdiction;
(3) The Act did not violate his due process rights because the
legislation provided all process that was due; (4) The Act was not a
U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 bill of attainder because its means were
rationally designed to meet its legitimate nonpunitive goals.
II. OTHER COURTS
A. Administrative law
3. Chissoe v. Jewell
No. 15-CV-0166-CVE-TLW, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132239 (N.D.
Okla. Sep. 27, 2016). This was an administrative appeal of agency
action by the United States Department of the Interior. Plaintiff
Darrell Chissoe (plaintiff) brought an appeal on behalf of his
deceased father, Paul Chissoe (Chissoe), pursuant to the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (APA).
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Plaintiff argues that the agency decision was arbitrary and contrary
to law because defendant failed to take restricted Indian land into
trust as mandated by federal statute and Bureau of Indian Affairs
(BIA) regulations. Defendant argued that the agency decision
should be affirmed because the BIA cannot take land into trust for a
deceased individual or an estate. Furthermore, plaintiff appeared to
be putting forth not only new arguments, but also entirely new
claims. The agency action at issue in the administrative appeal was
the BIA’s termination of plaintiff’s fee-to-trust process on the basis
of Chissoe’s death. In plaintiff’s opening brief, he asserted that he
was “bring[ing] this proceeding pursuant to the Administrative
Procedure Act upon failure of Defendant to take restricted Indian
land in trust.” Plaintiff’s opening brief then made two arguments:
that BIA’s failure to take the property into trust violates (1) a federal
statute and (2) the agency’s own regulations. Terminating an
application process and failing to take property into trust are two
different agency actions. The first is an action appealable under the
procedures contained in 25 C.F.R. § 2.7. The second is the failure of
an official to act and is appealable under the procedures contained
in 25 C.F.R. § 2.8. The claims plaintiff argues in the proceeding
were not the claim addressed in the administrative proceeding.
Therefore, the Court did not address the merits of plaintiff’s claims
argued in the opening brief and reply brief because they have not
been administratively exhausted. The court affirmed the decision of
the United States Department of the Interior Board of Indian
Appeals.
4. Cal. Valley Miwok Tribe v. Jewell
No. 2:16-01345 WBS CKD, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147053 (E.D.
Cal. Oct. 24, 2016). Plaintiffs Silvia Burley, Rashel Reznor,
Anjelica Paulk, and Tristian Wallace brought this action against
defendants Secretary of Interior Sally Jewell, Acting Assistant
Secretary of Interior Lawrence Roberts, and Director of the Bureau
of Indian Affairs (BIA) Michael Black for declaratory relief,
injunctive relief, and due process violations arising out an
administrative decision on the membership and leadership of the
California Valley Miwok Tribe (Tribe). Before the court was
plaintiffs’ motion to stay enforcement of the Assistant Secretary’s
December 30, 2015, decision (December 2015 Decision). This
action is part of a long-running leadership dispute over the Tribe
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between the Burley Faction – made up of Burley, Reznor, Paulk,
and Wallace--and Yakima Dixie. See Cal. Valley Miwok Tribe v.
United States, 424 F. Supp. 2d 197 (D.D.C. 2006) (hereinafter
“Miwok I”); Cal. Valley Miwok Tribe v. United States, 515 F.3d
1262, 380 U.S. App. D.C. 39 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (hereinafter “Miwok
II”); Cal. Valley Miwok Tribe v. Jewell, 5 F. Supp. 3d 86 (D.D.C.
2013) (hereinafter “Miwok III”). In 1916, the United States acquired
a parcel of land for the Tribe’s benefit. In a 2005 hearing, the BIA
refused to accept a constitution submitted by Burley that alleged that
the Burley Faction were the only Tribe members because the
constitution did not reflect the participation of the whole
community. This decision was upheld by the district court in Miwok
I and the D.C. Circuit in Miwok II. While Miwok II was pending,
the BIA notified Dixie and Burley that it would move forward with
facilitating the Tribe’s organization. In December 2010, the
Assistant Secretary determined that the tribal government was
organized under the 1998 Resolution and General Council. In
August 2011, the Assistant Secretary issued a revised decision that
reached the same conclusion. He found (1) the citizenship of the
Tribe consisted solely of Dixie and the Burley Faction and (2) the
1998 General Council was the Tribe’s government. Dixie
challenged the August 2011 Decision. Based on the record, the
Miwok III court held the August 2011 Decision was arbitrary and
capricious. The court held that the Assistant Secretary ignored
substantial evidence in the record and assumed conclusions without
providing a factual basis. The court remanded the case to the
Assistant Secretary. The Assistant Secretary issued his December
2015 Decision in response to the Miwok III remand. He held, based
on the record and previous federal decisions, that the Tribe’s
membership was not limited to five members and the 1998 General
Council was not a tribal government. Finally, the Assistant
Secretary found Dixie’s 2013 Constitution did not establish a tribal
government, but he allowed Dixie to submit additional evidence to
a Regional Director in order to determine whether the 2013
Constitution was validly ratified. Plaintiffs challenged the
December 2015 Decision and brought this suit against the federal
defendants. Because plaintiffs have failed to meet the second and
third prongs for a preliminary injunction, the court thus does not
need to address the likelihood of success on the merits. Accordingly,
the court must deny. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiffs’
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motion to stay the Assistant Secretary’s December 2015 Decision
pending final resolution of this case, considered as a motion for a
preliminary injunction, be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.
5. Upstate Citizens for Equal., Inc. v. United States
Nos. 15-1688, 15-1726, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 20192 (2d Cir.
Nov. 9, 2016). This case is the latest in a long line of lawsuits
regarding the efforts of the Oneida Indian Nation of New York (the
Tribe) to assert tribal jurisdiction over a portion of its indigenous
homeland in central New York State. After the Supreme Court
rejected the Tribe’s claim to existing, historically-rooted jurisdiction
over a portion of the homeland, see City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian
Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 125 S. Ct. 1478, 161 L. Ed. 2d 386 (2005),
the Tribe requested that the United States take approximately 17,000
acres of Tribe-owned land into trust on its behalf in procedures
prescribed by § 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. The
entrustment that the federal government approved in 2008 gave the
Tribe jurisdiction over approximately 13,000 acres of land in central
New York, allowing the Tribe, among other things, to continue to
operate its Turning Stone casino in Verona, New York. PlaintiffsAppellants, two towns, a civic organization, and several residents of
the area near the trust land, filed these lawsuits in an attempt to
reverse the land-into-trust decisions. They now appeal from
judgments of the Northern District of New York, granting the
summary judgment motions of Defendants-Appellants, the United
States and several federal officials. The District Court rejected
Plaintiffs’ claims that the land-into-trust procedures are
unconstitutional and that certain provisions of the Indian Land
Consolidation Act (ILCA), adopted in 1983, bar the United States
from taking land into trust for the Tribe. We agree with the District
Court that the entrustment procedure generally, and this entrustment
in particular, lie within the federal government’s long-recognized
“plenary” power over Indian tribes: Neither principles of state
sovereignty nor the Constitution’s Enclave Clause, which requires
state consent for the broadest federal assertions of jurisdiction over
land within a state, prevents the federal government from conferring
on the Tribe jurisdiction over these trust lands. We further hold that
the Oneida Nation of New York is eligible as a “tribe” within the
meaning of 25 U.S.C. §§ 465 and 2201(1) for land to be taken into
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trust on its behalf. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgments of the
District Court.
6. Miranda v. Jewell
No. 15-55245, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 22514 (9th Cir. Dec. 19,
2016). Margaret Miranda and members of her family (collectively,
the “Plaintiffs”) are the daughters, granddaughters, and greatgranddaughter of Rosa Pace, an enrolled member of the Santa Ynez
Band of Chumash Mission Indians (the “Band”). Those Plaintiffs
who are not already enrolled in the Band applied for enrollment, and
those who are already enrolled applied to have their recorded degree
of Santa Ynez blood increased. Under Santa Ynez law, for
enrollment in the Band, a person is required to have one-quarter or
more Santa Ynez blood. Whether the Plaintiffs who seek enrollment
have the requisite one-quarter Santa Ynez blood (and whether the
remaining Plaintiffs are entitled to blood-degree increases) depends
on whether Rosa Pace, their common ancestor, was a full-blooded
or half-blooded Santa Ynez Indian. The parties point to conflicting
sources of evidence on this issue. A 1940 Census Roll of the Band’s
members prepared by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (the “Bureau”)
lists Pace as a full-blooded Santa Ynez Indian. On the other hand, a
Membership Roll prepared by the Band in 1965 lists Pace’s blood
degree as one-half. Relying on the 1965 Membership Roll, the Band
denied the Plaintiffs’ applications, and the Plaintiffs appealed to the
Bureau. The Bureau sustained the Band’s decision to reject the
Plaintiffs’ applications. The Plaintiffs then filed this suit against
Secretary of the Interior Sally Jewell and the Department of the
Interior challenging the Bureau’s action on the Plaintiffs’ appeal
under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–596. The
district court granted the Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment, holding that the Bureau’s action was not “arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law.” The Plaintiffs timely appealed. Regulations appearing in
Part 62 of Title 25 of the Code of Federal Regulations provide that
the Bureau “shall” hear an appeal from an Indian tribe’s denial of an
enrollment application where the tribe’s “governing document” so
provides. In disposing of such an appeal, the Bureau does not abuse
its discretion where it defers to an Indian tribe’s “reasonable
interpretation of [its] own laws.” The reasonableness of a tribe’s
interpretation of its law is evaluated “based on the language of the
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[tribe’s] governing documents and the past practice of the [tribe].”
Aguayo v. Jewell, 827 F.3d 1213, 1228 (9th Cir. 2016). Here, Article
III of the Band’s Articles of Organization provides that a person is
eligible for enrollment in the Band if she is the living descendant of
a person whose name appears on the Band’s January 1, 1940 Census
Roll and if she has one-fourth or more degree of Indian blood of the
Band. Ordinance 2, passed by the Band’s General Council in 1965,
defines “Indian blood of the Band” to mean “the total percentage of
Indian blood derived from an ancestor . . . who [was] listed on the
1940 Census Roll.” Ordinance 2 also permits an applicant to appeal
an adverse enrollment decision to the Bureau. The Plaintiffs argue
that Article III requires the Band to look only to the 1940 Census
Roll, and no other documents, to determine an applicant’s degree of
Santa Ynez blood. Under Ordinance 2, however, the Band may
consider “tribal records, information presented in the application or
other sources of information” when evaluating an enrollment
application. Thus, the Band has interpreted Article III as not
forbidding the Band to review documents other than the 1940
Census Roll in determining an applicant’s degree of Indian blood of
the Band. This interpretation is reasonable given the language of the
Band’s governing documents and the past practice of the Band.
Article III does not define the term “Indian blood of the Band,” and
although it refers to no documents other than the 1940 Census Roll,
it neither expressly nor impliedly prohibits the Band from
considering such other documents when evaluating an enrollment
application. Because the Band’s interpretation of Article III is
“reasonable,” the Bureau did not abuse its discretion by deferring to
it and sustaining the Band’s rejection of the Plaintiffs’ applications.
Accordingly, the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the
Defendants is affirmed.
7. Mishewal Wappo Tribe Of Alexander Valley v. Ryan Zinke;
Michael Black
No. 15-15993, 2017 WL 1433323, 688 Fed. Appx. 480 (9th Cir.
Apr. 24, 2017). The Mishewal Wappo Tribe of Alexander Valley
(the Tribe) sued the Secretary and Assistant Secretary of the
Department of Interior (the Federal Defendants), asserting claims
for breach of fiduciary duty and violations under the Administrative
Procedure Act. The district court granted the Federal Defendants'
motion for summary judgment. (1) The district court correctly
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concluded that all of the Tribe's claims relied upon a central
allegation that the Federal Defendants unlawfully terminated the
Alexander Valley Rancheria. We decline to address the Tribe's new
argument that termination of the Rancheria did not terminate its
status as a federally recognized tribe because the Tribe did not raise
this argument before the district court. See Robinson v. Jewell, 790
F.3d 910, 915 (9th Cir. 2015). (2) The Tribe argues that the United
States owes a continuing fiduciary duty to the Tribe, and that the
existence of this duty precludes the running of the statute of
limitations. We do not decide whether the Federal Defendants owe
a fiduciary duty to the Tribe. If there is such a duty in this case, the
existence of such a duty does not at all prevent the statute of
limitations from running under the circumstances presented here.
(3) The Tribe did not diligently pursue its rights or show that
extraordinary circumstances prevented it from doing so. Equitable
tolling is therefore not appropriate. The Tribe argues that the Federal
Defendants induced it to not file an action or proceed through the
administrative recognition process by representing in various ways
that the Federal Defendants would restore the Tribe’s Status as a
federally recognized Tribe. The earliest piece of evidence the Tribe
cites to support this claim is a 1987 letter from the Area Director of
the Sacramento Area Office of the Bureau of Indian Affairs
recommends that the BIA adopt a policy to extend federal
recognition to various rancherias, including “Alexander Valley.”
Even assuming this letter induced the Tribe to refrain from pursuing
other avenues of recognition or litigation to rectify the purportedly
unlawful termination of the Rancheria, it was issued about twentysix years after the Rancheria was terminated. The 1987 letter could
not warrant tolling of the statute of limitations for the twenty years
beforehand. The Tribe did not meet its burden to support equitable
tolling. AFFIRMED.
8. Nooksack Indian Tribe v. Zinke
No. C17-0219-JCC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72364 (W.D. Wash.
May 11, 2017). This matter was before the Court on Plaintiff the
Nooksack Indian Tribe’s motion for preliminary injunction and
Defendants’ cross-motion to dismiss. Plaintiff the Nooksack Indian
Tribe brought this action against Defendants, collectively the
leadership of the Department of the Interior (DOI) and Bureau of
Indian Affairs (BIA). Since 2007, Plaintiff has been a party to 638

68

contracts with the DOI and BIA, entered into pursuant to the Indian
Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act. Plaintiff alleges
“under the terms of these contracts, the defendants fund the Tribe to
provide programs, functions, services, or activities of the [DOI] for
the benefit of Indians because of their status as Indians.” Plaintiff
brings this action partially “to compel the defendants to fully fund
contracts awarded to the Tribe under the Indian Self-Determination
and Education Assistance Act.”
However, the purported
disenrollment of hundreds of Nooksack tribe members in late 2016
and the recent tribal government changes, all completed when the
Nooksack Indian Tribal Council lacked a quorum, are fundamental
underlying facts in this action. On June 21, 2013, Nooksack Indian
voters approved a membership requirement change to the Nooksack
Constitution proposed by the Council. The change was challenged
in the Nooksack tribal courts and upheld. However, the membership
criteria change is currently before the DOI’s Interior Board of Indian
Appeals for approval. In March 2016, the Nooksack Indian Tribal
Council scheduled a general election to fill three council seats whose
terms were set to expire on March 24, 2016. However, “the Tribe
delayed the election, and the three Council members retained their
seats as holdovers pending the election of their replacements.”
Regardless of the reason for cancelling the 2016 election, as of
March 24, 2016, only three of eight Council members occupy seats
whose terms have not expired. Therefore, Defendants allege the
Council has been acting without a quorum since March 24, 2016.
The Court will refer to the Council group, as composed after
March 24, 2016, as the holdover Council for clarity. On January 21,
2017, Plaintiff and the holdover Council allegedly conducted a
general election to fill the three seats held by the holdover Council
members whose terms had expired. There were no challenges to the
election results. The results were “certified by the duly-appointed
Election Superintended [sic], consistent with Nooksack law.”
Defendants maintain their disapproval of the holdover Council,
calling its conduct “abusive,” and alleging the Council has “used its
de facto control to systematically abridge the rights of a disfavored
group of tribal members, thereby depriving them of their right to
fully participate in and receive benefits under federal programs.”
The holdover Council, on behalf of the Nooksack Indian Tribe, now
moves the Court to enter a preliminary injunction enjoining
Defendants from “(1) taking further steps to reassume
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responsibilities the Tribe performs for its enrolled members under
its Public Law 638 contracts; (2) taking further actions based on
three opinion letters written by [PDAS Roberts]; and (3) continuing
to interfere with the Tribe’s self-governance by refusing to
acknowledge that the current, duly-elected members of the
Nooksack Tribal Council are the Tribe’s governing body.”
Defendants opposed the motion, and filed a cross-motion to dismiss,
or in the alternative for summary judgment, arguing that the Court
lacks jurisdiction over this case. (Dkt. No. 26.) Because Defendants
challenge the Court’s jurisdiction over this matter, the Court will
consider the motion to dismiss first. These are very rare
circumstances. The DOI found that the Nooksack Indian Tribal
Council, currently existing as the holdover Council, lacks authority
due to a lack of quorum. The DOI decisions stand during the interim
until the DOI and BIA recognize a newly elected Nooksack Indian
Tribal Council. This Court’s lack of jurisdiction is not permanent or
inflexible. If the DOI and BIA recognize Nooksack tribal leadership
after new elections and the nation-to-nation relationship is resumed,
the new tribal leadership would have authority to initiate an action
against the federal government. However, under this set of facts and
with a clear lack of recognition from the DOI and BIA, the Court
must decline jurisdiction. Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction IS GRANTED. The holdover Council’s
claims are DISMISSED with prejudice.
9. Cherokee Nation v. Jewell
No. CIV-14-428-RAW, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82896 (E.D. Okla.
May 31, 2017). On May 24, 2011, the Bureau of Indian Affairs
(BIA), Eastern Oklahoma Region (Region) for the United States
Department of the Interior (DOI) issued a Decision (2011 Decision)
approving an amended application of the United Keetoowah Band
of Cherokee Indians in Oklahoma (UKB) to take a seventy-six acre
tract located in Cherokee County (Subject Tract) into trust for the
use and benefit of the UKB Corporation. The UKB owns the Subject
Tract in fee. The Subject Tract is also located within the former
reservation of the Cherokee Nation. The Cherokee Nation filed this
action challenging the 2011 Decision, pursuant to the
Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (APA) and 25
U.S.C. § 465. The Cherokee Nation argues that the 2011 Decision
is arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, and otherwise not
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in accordance with law because, inter alia, there is no statutory or
regulatory authority to take land into trust for the UKB Corporation,
the Cherokee Nation’s consent is required to take the Subject Tract
into trust, the 2011 Decision violates its treaties, and ignores the
administrative burdens that would be created by the trust
acquisition. The Cherokee Nation urges this court to set aside the
2011 Decision and to enjoin the Secretary of the Interior (Secretary)
from accepting the Subject Tract into trust. The 2011 Decision was
arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, and otherwise not
in accordance with law. Accordingly, the court finds in favor of the
Cherokee Nation and remands this action to the Region.
Furthermore, in accordance with the court’s findings herein, the
Secretary is enjoined from taking the Subject Tract into trust without
the Cherokee Nation’s written consent and full consideration of the
jurisdictional conflicts and the resulting administrative burdens the
acquisition would place on the Region. Before taking any land into
trust for the UKB or the UKB Corporation, the Region shall consider
the effect of Carcieri on such acquisition.
10.

Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, et al. v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, et al.

No. 16–1534 (JEB), 255 F. Supp. 3d 101, 2017 WL 2573994
(D.D.C. Jun. 14, 2017). Indian tribes brought action under
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) against Army Corps of
Engineers alleging, inter alia, that Corps’ authorization of crude oil
pipeline under federally regulated waterway bordering tribes’
reservations violated National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),
Rivers and Harbors Act (RHA), and Mineral Leasing Act (MLA).
Indian tribes moved for partial summary judgment and Corps crossmoved for partial summary judgment. The District Court held that:
(1) Corps took requisite “hard look” at risk of oil spill in its
environmental assessment (EA) of pipeline; (2) Corps failed to take
requisite “hard look” at methodological and data flaws in its
assessment of oil spill risk identified in expert reports submitted to
Corps; (3) Corps took requisite “hard look” at potential impact of
construction of pipeline on tribe’s water, fishing, and hunting treaty
rights in its EA; (4) Corps failed to take requisite “hard look” at
potential impact of oil spill on tribe’s fishing and hunting treaty
rights in its EA; (5) Corps adequately considered alternatives to
proposed location of pipeline in its EA; (6) Corps’ use of 0.5-mile
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buffer in environmental-justice analysis under NEPA was arbitrary
and capricious; (7) grant of easement under MLA did not violate
Corps’ trust responsibility to protect tribe’s treaty rights; (8) Corps’
conclusion that pipeline would not impair waterway, as required for
issuance of RHA permit, was not arbitrary and capricious; and
(9) Corps imposed sufficient liability on pipeline operator, as
required for easement under MLA. Ordered accordingly.
B. Child Welfare Law and Indian Child
Welfare Act (ICWA)
11. Renteria v. Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians
No. 2:16-cv-1685-MCE-AC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119394 (E.D.
Cal. Sep. 2, 2016). Plaintiffs Efrim and Talisha Renteria
(“Plaintiffs”) brought an action against the Shingle Springs Band of
Miwok Indians (“Tribe”), its Tribal Council, its Tribal Court,
Christine Williams in her official capacity as the Tribal Court judge,
Regina Cuellar in both her official capacity as a member of the
Tribal Council and her individual capacity as the appointed guardian
of Plaintiffs’ three minor nieces (“Minors”), all of whom are under
seven years old. They seek to prevent the enforcement of Tribal
Court’s June 3, 2016 Order (June 3 Order) appointing Defendant
Regina Cuellar as the legal guardian of the Minors. Their Complaint
attacked the Tribal Court’s jurisdiction over the custody
proceedings, and further alleged that the June 3 Order is
unenforceable in courts subject to the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution because the underlying proceedings
violated Plaintiffs’ due process rights. Plaintiffs are the maternal
great aunt and uncle of the Minors. The Minors’ parents were killed
in a car accident on December 17, 2015. Their late father was a
member of the Tribe, but the Minors resided and were domiciled
with their parents in Visalia, California. They have never resided or
been domiciled on tribal lands. Plaintiffs cared for the Minors in the
weeks following the accident. On January 5, 2016, members of the
children’s paternal family appeared at Plaintiffs’ house in Visalia,
presented a copy of an emergency order issued by the Tribal Court
of the Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians (Tribal Court) to
Plaintiffs and forcibly removed the two youngest Minors (the eldest
Minor remained hospitalized from injuries sustained in the car
accident that killed her parents). On January 22, 2016, the Tribal
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Court held a review hearing regarding guardianship, appointed
Plaintiffs as temporary guardians for the Minors, and established a
schedule of visitations for the paternal family. Beginning in
February 2016, the two older children repeatedly reported that their
paternal step-grandfather (Joseph) sexually abused them during
their visits. Plaintiffs reported the abuse to the Visalia Police
Department and the Tulare County Health & Human Services
Agency. In the days that followed Plaintiffs’ initial police report, the
children were interviewed outside of Plaintiffs’ presence on three
separate occasions by social workers with no connection to the
family. The two older children continued to report instances of
sexual abuse by Joseph to these social workers. After Plaintiffs
made these reports, the Tribal Court modified the visitation order
such that Joseph was not to have access to the Minors. On June 3,
2016, the Tribal Court appointed Defendant Regina Cuellar as the
Minors’ permanent guardian over Plaintiffs’ competing petition and
objections. Defendant Cuellar’s appointment became effective June
12, 2016. At the same time, the Tribal Court issued a visitation order
that failed to restrict Joseph’s access to the Minors. The Minors then
went for visitation with Defendant Regina Cuellar on June 4 and 5.
The failure to restrict Joseph’s access to the Minors during this visit
resulted in yet another instance of alleged sexual abuse. Plaintiffs
declined to give custody of the Minors to the paternal family on June
12 and caused a Good Cause Report to be filed with the Tulare
County District Attorney. Plaintiffs then filed this action on July 21,
2016. They seek a declaration that the Tribal Court lacked
jurisdiction to appoint a guardian for the Minors in the first instance,
a declaration that the proceedings that led to the appointment of
Regina Cuellar violated Plaintiffs’ due process rights, and an
injunction preventing the enforcement of the June 3 Order outside
of tribal lands. The Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) enjoining enforcement of the Tribal Court’s June 3 Order
pending a hearing on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
As a result of that order, plaintiffs requested a supplemental TRO
enjoining the enforcement of any additional Tribal Court orders in
the custody proceeding pending the resolution of Plaintiffs’ Motion.
The Court denied Plaintiffs’ application for a supplemental TRO for
failure to comply with Local Rule 231. Defendants oppose
Plaintiffs’ Motion. They contend that the Court lacks jurisdiction
over the Tribal Defendants, and that Plaintiffs’ action cannot
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proceed solely against Defendant Cuellar in her individual capacity
under Rule 19(b). Defendants’ sovereign immunity argument, while
not entirely convincing, raises serious questions about the Court’s
jurisdiction over the Tribal Defendants. The Court, however, can
provide Plaintiffs with the relief they seek by dismissing the Tribal
Defendants and allowing this action to go forward against Regina
Cuellar in her individual capacity. The Court dismisses the Tribal
Defendants, finds that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 does not
mandate joinder, and proceeds to the merits of Plaintiffs’ Motion
solely with respect to Defendant Cuellar. As to their due process
claim, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to preliminary
injunctive relief and GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion with respect to
Defendant Cuellar in her individual capacity. Plaintiffs’ action may
proceed against Defendant Regina Cuellar in her individual
capacity, and their Motion for Preliminary Injunction is GRANTED
as to Defendant Regina Cuellar in her individual capacity.
Defendant Cuellar is hereby ENJOINED from attempting to seek
recognition or enforcement of the Tribal Court’s June 3 Order
appointing her as permanent guardian of the Minors outside of the
Tribal Court pending a final disposition of this action on the merits.
12. State v. Reich-Crabtree (In re M.H.C.)
No. 114552, 2016 Okla. LEXIS 91, 2016 OK 88 (OK, Sep. 13,
2016). Cherokee Nation filed a motion to transfer the deprived case
of M.H.C. to tribal court upon natural mother’s tribal enrollment.
State of Oklahoma and foster mother objected. The district court
granted the motion to transfer, finding State and foster mother failed
to present clear-and-convincing evidence to overcome the
presumption in favor of tribal court jurisdiction in cases concerning
the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963
(1978). Section 1911(b) of the ICWA controls a motion to transfer
a child-custody proceeding from state court to tribal court where the
child is an Indian child under the statutory definition. The questions
presented to this Court are whether the district court erred when it
(1) found ICWA applicable to a case where the child was not an
Indian child when the case was filed and (2) found lack of good
cause to keep the case in state court. As an aside, before this Court
is also the question whether a finding of ICWA’s applicability must
be applied retroactively to all prior proceedings in the case. M.H.C.
(the child) was born in September of 2013. The Oklahoma
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Department of Human Services (DHS) placed the child in protective
custody on November 5, 2013. In the initial petition filed on
November 18, 2013, the State of Oklahoma declared ICWA’s
provisions applicable. On November 21, 2013, the Cherokee Nation
appeared at the initial appearance, and the natural mother informed
the court that she had a Certificate of Degree of Indian Blood but
was not currently a tribal member. The natural mother was informed
if she gained membership in the Cherokee Nation, ICWA would
apply. The natural mother was also told if ICWA applied, the child
would likely have to leave foster mother’s care because foster
mother was a non-ICWA compliant placement. No party informed
the natural mother of ICWA’s benefits and protections. The natural
mother declined to enroll at the time. The appellate court found that
the district court did not err in granting the motion to transfer the
proceedings to the Cherokee Nation tribal court. The district court
did not err in finding ICWA applicable upon the natural mother’s
enrollment in the Cherokee Nation. ICWA applies to the
proceedings prospectively from the date the record supports its
application. Appellants have failed to present clear-and-convincing
evidence of “good cause” for the case to remain in the Rogers
County District Court. Because the district court did not err in
granting the motion to transfer to Tribal Court, we affirm the order
granting the motion to transfer.
13.

In re O.C.

No. A147577, 2016 WL 6879279 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2016).
County children and family services agency filed petition against
mother and father to terminate their parental rights to minor
children, who potentially had Indian heritage. Following hearing,
the Superior Court found both children adoptable, that exception to
adoption for sibling bond did not apply, and that Indian Child
Welfare Act (ICWA) did not apply and terminated parental rights.
Mother and father appealed. The appellate court held that trial court
failed to comply with notice requirements of ICWA and state law.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
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14.

Daniel H. and Linda H. v. Tyler R.
(In re Adoption of Micah H.)

No. S-15-1080, 2016 Neb. LEXIS 169, 295 Neb. 213 (Neb. Dec. 2,
2016). This case presents the issue of whether the “active efforts”
and “serious emotional or physical damage” elements of the federal
Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (lCWA) and the Nebraska Indian
Child Welfare Act (NICWA) apply to provide increased protection
to the parental rights of a non-Indian, noncustodial parent of an
“Indian child.” Daniel H. and Linda H., the maternal grandparents
and guardians of Micah H., a minor child, appeal the order of the
Saunders County Court denying their petition to adopt Micah. In
their petition, Daniel and Linda alleged, among other things, that the
child’s mother (their daughter), Allison H., had consented to the
adoption; that the father, Tyler R., had abandoned Micah; and that
terminating Allison’s and Tyler’s parental rights was in Micah’s
best interests. In Tyler’s answer, he alleged that Micah was an
“Indian Child” pursuant to ICWA and NICWA. Because neither
party disputed that Micah met the “Indian child” definition under
both acts, the county court applied those acts, which provide
heightened protection to the rights of parents and tribes in
proceedings involving custody, termination of parental rights, and
adoption of Indian children. After a hearing on Daniel and Linda’s
petition, the county court found that it was compelled to deny the
petition, because it was ‘‘unable to find beyond a reasonable doubt
that [Tyler] has abandoned the child.” The appellate court found
that the county court erred in applying the “beyond a reasonable
doubt” standard to the abandonment element and also in finding that
Daniel and Linda were not required to show active efforts had been
made to unite Tyler and Micah. We therefore reverse, and remand
with directions to allow the parties to submit additional evidence in
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Reversed and
remanded.
15. Oglala Sioux Tribe & Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Fleming
No. CIV. 13-5020-JLB, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173571 (D.S.D.
Dec. 15, 2016). The defendants continue to disregard this court’s
March 30, 2015, partial summary judgment order. That order
outlined the defendants’ violations of the rights of Indian children,
parents, custodians and tribes guaranteed by the Due Process Clause
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of the Fourteenth Amendment and by the Indian Child Welfare Act
(ICWA). Notwithstanding testimony confirming that South Dakota
Circuit Court Judges in Meade County, Brown County, Hughes
County and Minnehaha County are conducting adversarial hearings
in accord with the March 2015 order prior to the extended removal
of Indian children from their homes, defendants refuse to reform
their violative policies and practices. The court repeatedly invited
the defendants to propose a plan for compliance with their
constitutional and statutory obligations, but the defendants rejected
that opportunity. This order discusses the need and the authority for
this court to impose remedies to vindicate plaintiffs’ rights. Orders
for declaratory and injunctive relief are filed simultaneously with
this order. On March 21,2013, plaintiffs filed this civil rights action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting defendants’ policies,
practices and procedures relating to the removal of Indian children
from their homes during state court 48-hour hearings violate the
ICWA and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Defendants denied plaintiffs’ claims. On July 11, 2014, plaintiffs
filed two separate motions identified as the “Section 1922 Claims”
and the “Due Process Claims.” Following extensive submissions by
the parties, on March 30, 2015, the court entered an order granting
plaintiffs’ motions (2015 order). By the 2015 order, the court
reserved ruling on plaintiffs’ request for declaratory and injunctive
relief. On August 17. 2016, a hearing was held to address plaintiffs’
prayer for relief (remedies hearing). For the reasons stated below,
plaintiffs’ request for a declaratory judgment is granted, plaintiffs’
request for injunctive relief is granted in part and plaintiffs’ request
for appointment of a monitor is denied without prejudice as
premature. Plaintiffs Oglala Sioux Tribe and Rosebud Sioux Tribe
are Indian tribes officially recognized by the United States with
reservations located within the State of South Dakota. The class of
plaintiffs includes “all other members of federally recognized Indian
tribes who reside in Pennington County, South Dakota, and who,
like plaintiffs, are parents or custodians of Indian children.”
Defendant Lynne A. Valenti is the Secretary of the South Dakota
Department of Social Services (DSS). Since January 2010,
approximately one hundred 48-hour hearings involving Indian
children are held each year in Pennington County. In March 2015,
the court found that despite “the clear intent of ICWA, the
[Department of the Interior] Guidelines and the SD Guidelines, all
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of which contemplate evidence will be presented on the record in
open court, Judge Davis relied on the ICWA affidavit and petition
for temporary custody which routinely are disclosed only to him and
not to the Indian parents, their attorney or custodians.” These
undisclosed documents are not subject to cross-examination or
challenge by the presentation of contradictory evidence. The
practice of the state court was to “authorize DSS to perform the
function of determining if, or when, the imminent risk of physical
harm to an Indian child has passed and to restore custody to the
child’s parents. . . . This authorization vests full discretion in DSS
to make the decision if and when an Indian child may be reunited
with the parents. The court found this abdication of judicial
authority violated the protections guaranteed Indian parents,
children and tribes under ICWA. In the March 2015 order, the court
found the defendants violated plaintiffs’ due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment during the course of 48-hour hearings. The
violations are summarized as follows: (1) failing to appoint counsel
in advance of the 48-hour hearing; (2) failing to provide notice of
the claims against Indian parents, the issues to be resolved and the
state’s burden of proof; (3) denial of the right to cross-examine
adverse witnesses; (4) denying Indian parents or custodians the right
to present evidence in their own defense; and (5) removing Indian
children on grounds not based on evidence presented in the hearing.
The Court ordered that plaintiffs’ request for a declaratory judgment
and injunctive relief is granted.
16.

A.D. by Carter v. Washburn

No. CV-15-01259-PHX-NVW, 2017 WL 1019685 (D. Az. Mar. 16,
2017). Before the Court are motions to dismiss. In this action the
adult Plaintiffs and those who have undertaken to speak for the child
Plaintiffs attempt to challenge parts of the Indian Child Welfare Act
(ICWA) as unconstitutional racial discrimination. They also
challenge Congress’s power to enact laws regulating state court
proceedings and ousting state laws concerning foster care
placement, termination of parental rights, pre-adoptive placement,
and adoptive placements of some off-reservation children of Indian
descent. Plaintiffs seek a declaration that certain provisions of the
ICWA and of the Guidelines for State Courts and Agencies in Indian
Child Custody Proceedings published on February 25, 2015 (2015
Guidelines) by the Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian
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Affairs (BIA), violate the United States Constitution, federal civil
rights statutes, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act by requiring State
courts to treat Indian children differently than non-Indian children
in child custody proceedings. Plaintiffs wish to adjudicate here in
advance of injury to themselves. They do not have standing to have
this Court pre-adjudicate for state court judges how to rule on facts
that may arise and that may be governed by statutes or guidelines
that this Court may think invalid. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED
that the Federal Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss First Amended
Complaint, the State Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First
Amended Civil Rights Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, and
Other Relief, the Gila River Indian Community’s Motion to
Dismiss, and the Navajo Nation’s Amended Motion to Dismiss are
granted.
17.

Jude M. v. State

No. S-16233, 2017 WL 1533373, 394 P.3d 543 (Alaska Apr. 28,
2017). Office of Children’s Services (OCS) filed petition to
terminate father’s parental rights to Native American child
adjudicated as child in need of aid. The superior court declined to
terminate parental rights, but instead established long-term
guardianship over child placed with foster family out-of-state.
Father appealed. The supreme court held that: (1) superior court had
statutory authority to establish long-term guardianship over child
after it declined to terminate father’s parental rights; (2) regulation
prohibiting agency from placing child in guardianship without
evidence that parental rights have been terminated or suspended did
not apply; (3) long-term guardianship was not de facto termination
of father’s parental rights that failed to comply with Indian Child
Welfare Act (ICWA); (4) active efforts were made to provide
remedial and rehabilitative services designed to prevent breakup of
family, as prerequisite to foster care placement/guardianship under
ICWA; (5) determination that father, who was convicted sex
offender, posed significant risk of re-offending and that risk
encompassed child, was not supported by expert testimony;
(6) evidence supported finding that father was unable to meet child’s
caregiving needs, and thus, that father’s continued custody of child
was likely to result in serious emotional or physical harm;
(7) evidence supported finding that long-term guardianship under
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current foster family placement was in child’s best interest. Vacated;
remanded.
18.

The People of the State of South Dakota in the Interest of
A.O., V.O. and C.O., Children and Concerning V.S.O.,
Respondent, C.G, Indian Custodian and OGLALA SIOUX
TRIBE, Intervener

Nos. 27864 and 27999, 896 N.W. 2d 652, 2017 S.D. 30, 2017 WL
2290151 (S.D. May 24, 2017). Law enforcement removed A.O.,
V.O., and C.O. (the Children) from the home of their mother, V.S.O.
(Mother), after discovering methamphetamine and drug
paraphernalia in the home. Mother is an enrolled member of the
Oglala Sioux Tribe (the Tribe). The same day, the State asked the
circuit court to award temporary custody of the Children to the South
Dakota Department of Social Services (the Department). The court
granted the request. The Tribe was given timely notice and
intervened. More than one year after the State initiated abuse-andneglect proceedings against Mother the circuit court denied motions
to transfer the case to the jurisdiction of the Tribe. Mother appeals
the termination of her parental rights, raising one issue: Whether
she was entitled to a hearing on the question whether good cause
existed to deny the motions to transfer jurisdiction to the Tribe.
Mother argued that the circuit court erred by denying the motions
without holding an evidentiary hearing. The appellate court found
that the circuit court was required to conduct an evidentiary hearing
on the question whether good cause existed to deny Mother’s and
the Tribe’s motions to transfer the proceedings to the Tribe’s
jurisdiction. The court was also required to make specific factual
findings on this issue. The court failed to do so. Therefore, the court
abused its discretion in denying the motions. The appellate court
reversed the circuit court’s final dispositional order and remanded
with instructions for the court to hold an evidentiary hearing on the
question whether good cause exists to deny the motions to transfer.
19.

Doe v. Piper

No. 15-2639 (JRT/DTS), 2017 U.S Dist. LEXIS 124308 (D. Minn.
Aug. 4, 2017). Plaintiffs Jane and John Doe (the Does) brought this
action seeking injunctive relief and a declaration that the portions of
the Minnesota Indian Family Preservation Act (MIFPA), Minn. Stat.
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§§ 260.751-260.835, that require notice to Indian tribes for any
voluntary adoption involving an “Indian child” and provide relevant
Indian tribes a right of intervention are unconstitutional. The
remaining defendants in this case are the Commissioner of the
Minnesota Department of Human Resources, Emily Johnson Piper,
and the Minnesota Attorney General, Lori Swanson (collectively,
Defendants). The Does challenge two particular MIFPA provisions.
First, the Does challenge the “notice” provision, under which “a
local social services agency, private child-placing agency, petitioner
in the adoption, or any other party” must notify the applicable “tribal
social services agency” if the agency or person “has reason to
believe that a child who is the subject of an adoptive or pre-adoptive
placement proceeding is or may be an ‘Indian child’” under the
statute. Minn. Stat. § 260.761. Second, the Does challenge the
“intervention” provision, which provides an Indian child’s tribe the
right to intervene at any point in adoption proceedings involving the
child. In April 2015, Baby Doe was born to the Does in Minneapolis,
Minnesota. The Does are an unmarried couple, together since 2003,
who live together with their children. The Does are both enrolled
members of Indian tribes, Jane Doe in the Mille Lacs Band of
Ojibwe, but neither domiciles within or resides on an Indian
reservation. No court terminated the Does’ parental rights. Instead,
the Does decided to voluntarily place Baby Doe for adoption and
relinquish their parental rights. To facilitate Baby Doe’s adoption,
the Does engaged a private direct placement agency that would
allow the Does to choose Baby Doe’s adoptive parents. Neither of
the chosen adoptive parents is of American Indian descent. The
Does and the adoptive parents arranged an open adoption. The Does
did not want to comply with the notice requirement because they did
not want any tribe to learn of their adoption or risk a tribe’s
intervention, which could lead to deviation from the adoption plan
that they determined was best for their child. The Court found no
threat of irreparable harm because the state court could protect the
Does’ identities and the Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe had already
agreed not to intervene. Based on the foregoing, and all of the files,
records, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and
2. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
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20.

In re DETMER/BEAUDRY, Minors

No. 336348, __ N.W. 2d __, 2017 WL 3614234 (Mich. App. Aug.
22, 2017). We consider here whether the special protections
provided to Native American parents and children under state law
apply when a child is taken from her mother’s care and residence
and placed in her father’s care and residence. Respondent-mother
and her children, AB and KD, are eligible for the protections
afforded to Native American families under Michigan Indian Family
Preservation Act (MIFPA). The trial court removed AB from the
care and residence of respondent-mother, and this removal triggered
the statutory protections set forth in MCL 712B.15(2). Concluding
that one of respondent-mother’s children (AB) was “removed,” we
hold that the special protections set forth in the MIFPA do apply to
AB’s removal. Because the trial court failed to comply with those
protections, we vacate and remand for further proceedings. With
respect to the other child at issue in this appeal (KD), we hold that
the special protections do not apply because KD was not removed
from respondent-mother, but instead voluntarily placed by
respondent-mother with KD’s father. The trial court erred by not
affording respondent-mother and AB these protections and,
accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s order of adjudication with
respect to AB and remand for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
C.
21.

Contracting

N. Arapaho Tribe v. LaCounte

No. CV-16-11-BLG-BMM, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143389 (D.
Mont. Oct. 17, 2016). Plaintiffs Northern Arapaho Tribe (“NAT”)
allege that Defendants violated their right to self-govern when
Defendants converted NAT’s funds and federal funds and programs
established by Congress for the benefit of NAT. Federal Defendants
hold positions with the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”). NAT
seeks declaratory and injunctive relief along with the establishment
of a constructive trust that would serve as a vehicle to recover
allegedly converted funds. NAT also filed a motion for preliminary
injunction. Federal Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss the
action on the grounds that: (1) the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction, (2) NAT has failed to state a claim on which relief can
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be granted, and (3) NAT has failed to join an indispensable party.
The Shoshone Tribe and the United States entered into a Treaty on
July 2, 1868. 15 State. 673. The treaty established the Wind River
Reservation “for the absolute and undisturbed use and occupation of
the Shoshonee Indians.” 15 State. 673. The Eastern Shoshonee
Tribe (“EST”) settled in the Wind River Reservation. The United
States placed NAT on the Wind River Reservation in 1878. The
tribes share the Wind River Reservation. Each tribe governs itself
by vote of its tribal membership at general council meetings or by
vote of its elected business council. No member of one tribe may
hold office or legislate for the other tribe. The tribes have not entered
into a joint constitution to consolidate their respective governments.
The federal government created the Joint Business Council (“JBC”)
following the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. The federal
government apparently considered it easier to interact with the two
tribes’ business councils in joint form. The JBC originally contained
the requirement that a quorum comprise four members from each
tribe. NAT formally withdrew its participation from the JBC in
September 2014. The Complaint alleges that the former SBC
Defendants continue to operate the JBC and hold themselves out to
third parties as having authority to act for both tribes. EST allegedly
changed the quorum for the JBC to require only four members from
EST rather than the original requirement of four members from each
tribe. SBC Defendants allegedly have used the JBC to move shared
property, to transfer federal and tribal funds from a joint account to
accounts solely controlled by the SBC, and to make important
employment and personnel decisions that affect both tribes. NAT
further alleges that SBC Defendants misappropriated joint 638 selfdetermination contracts. Specifically, NAT alleges that Federal
Defendants have entered into 638 self-determination contracts with
the JBC without the necessary approval from NAT. NAT alleges
that Federal Defendants wrongfully have awarded 638 selfdetermination contracts to the JBC despite knowing that NAT had
withdrawn from the JBC. Norma Gourneau, BIA Superintendent for
the Wind River Agency, sent a letter to both tribes’ business
councils on August 3, 2016. (“Gourneau Letter”). Gourneau
acknowledged that the BIA had approved self-determination
contracts with SBC-as-JBC “on a temporary basis.” Gourneau also
stated that the BIA no longer would accept contract proposals for
shared programs from either tribe without supporting resolutions
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from both tribes. Gourneau cited to 25 U.S.C. § 5304(l) for support.
Title 25 U.S.C. § 5304(l) prohibits the BIA from “letting or making”
a self-determination contract “to perform services benefitting more
than one Indian tribe” without “the approval of each such Indian
tribe.” NAT requests that the Court enjoin Federal Defendants from
(1) representing that SBC possesses authority to take actions on
behalf of NAT; and (2) approving unilateral action by SBC that
affects NAT’s property, assets, program decisions, personnel
directive, budget approvals, or policy changes. The Court:
(1) denied Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss; (2) granted Plaintiff’s
Motion for Preliminary Injunction requiring that in accordance with
the Gourneau Letter, Defendants shall refrain from approving 638
contracts for multi-tribal, shared services without the approval, via
tribal government resolution, of both the Northern Arapaho Tribe
and the Eastern Shoshone Tribe.
22.

Swinomish Indian Tribal Cmty. v. BNSF Ry. Co.

No. C15-543RSL, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5497 (W.D. Wash.
Jan. 13, 2017). This matter comes before the Court on plaintiff’s
Amended Motion for Summary Judgment and defendant BNSF
Railway Company’s Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
Plaintiff filed this suit in April 2015 alleging that defendant
breached a Right-of-Way Easement Agreement (Easement
Agreement), asserting claims of breach of contract and trespass, and
seeking damages, declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief.
Defendant raised preemption as an affirmative defense, arguing that
plaintiff’s claims are barred by the Interstate Commerce
Commission Termination Act (ICCTA), 49 U.S.C. § 10501 et seq.
Plaintiff filed a motion for a summary determination of the
preemption defense. Defendant cross-moved on the preemption
issue and seeks judgment in its favor on the breach of contract,
trespass, and injunctive relief claims. In the Easement Agreement
Burlington Northern agreed to pay $125,000 as full payment for all
rent, damages and compensation of any sort, due for past occupancy
of the right-of-way from date of construction in 1889 until January
1, 1989. Thereafter, Burlington Northern would pay $10,000 per
year, adjusted periodically based on the Consumer Price Index and
changes in property values. The easement has an initial term of forty
years, with two twenty-year extensions at Burlington Northern’s
option. Burlington Northern promised to keep the Tribe informed as
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to the nature and identity of all cargo transported by Burlington
Northern across the Reservation through annual disclosures and to
comply strictly with all Federal and State Regulations regarding
classifying, packaging and handling of rail cars so as to provide the
least risk and danger to persons, property and the natural
environment of the Reservation. Burlington Northern also promised
that unless otherwise agreed in writing, only one eastern bound train,
and one western bound train would cross the Reservation each day.
The number of trains and cars were not to be increased unless
required by shipper needs. It is understood and agreed that if the
number of crossings or the number of cars is increased, the annual
rental will be subject to adjustment. The Tribe alleges that BNSF
Railway Company, Burlington Northern’s successor, has breached
the terms and conditions of the easement and that the overburdening
of the right of way constitutes a trespass. Since at least 1999, BNSF
had not complied with the cargo reporting requirement despite
requests from the Tribe. In October 2011, the Tribe contacted BNSF
about reports that Tesoro Refining & Marketing Company, LLC,
one of the oil companies with operations in Anacortes, Washington,
intended to ship, and BNSF intended to carry, crude oil in 100-car
trains across the reservation. The Tribe reminded BNSF of its
obligation to obtain written approval for any such increase in traffic
and expressed concern regarding the impact of the proposed
increase on the Tribe’s recently-completed hotel development
project. BNSF did not respond. The Tribe sent a second letter in
September 2012 when 100-car shipments from Tesoro began. In
February 2013, BNSF confirmed that, in addition to the locals that
serve the March Point refineries, unit trains of crude oil from North
Dakota averaging 102 cars in each direction were crossing the
reservation almost every day. The Tribe would not approve such
shipments, and BNSF announced its intention to continue running
the unit trains as it had been doing since 2012. This litigation
followed, with the Tribe seeking declaratory and injunctive relief in
addition to damages. The cross-motions for summary judgment
raise three separate issues: (1) whether there has been a breach of
contract; (2) whether the ICCTA preempts the Tribe’s state law
claims; and (3) whether the ICCTA preempts the remedies afforded
by the Indian Right of Way Act (IRWA) for breach of the Easement
Agreement. The court granted in part and denied in part the crossmotions for summary judgment. The Tribe is entitled to a
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declaration that BNSF breached the terms of the Easement
Agreement by failing to make annual disclosures regarding the
cargo it was carrying across the reservation and by increasing the
number of trains and cars traversing the reservation without first
seeking to obtain the Tribe’s written assent. The state law claims for
damages, compelled disclosures, and an adjustment in rent are not
preempted by the ICCTA. To the extent the Tribe seeks an
injunction limiting the type of cargo or the number of trains or cars
crossing the reservation, whether under a breach of contract,
trespass, or estoppel theory, those remedies are unavailable in this
jurisdiction. The Tribe may seek a declaration of its contractual
rights from the Surface Transportation Board and/or it may initiate
the right of way cancellation procedures provided under in the
International Right of Way Association and its implementing
regulations.
23.

Navajo Nation v. United States Department of Interior.

No. 16-5117, 852 F.3d 1124 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 4, 2017). Indian tribe
brought action alleging that Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), an
agency within Department of the Interior (DOI), violated Indian
Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDEAA) by
failing to disburse certain funding. The district court, 174 F. Supp.
3d 161, entered summary judgment in favor of DOI. Indian tribe
appealed. The appellate court held that: (1) deadline for BIA to
approve or reject tribe's proposal began to run on date tribe hand
delivered proposal during partial government shutdown to exempted
employee at BIA regional office, rather than date furloughed BIA
employee who was responsible for such proposals returned to office;
(2) tribe's silence, in face of repeated assertions by BIA concerning
deadline, did not equitably estop tribe from disputing timeliness of
BIA's response; and (3) partial government shutdown did not
equitably toll deadline. Reversed.
24.

Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Michigan v. Blue Cross
Blue Shield of Michigan

No. 16-cv-10317, 2017 WL 3007074 (E.D. Mich. Jul. 14, 2017). On
January 29, 2016, Plaintiffs Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of
Michigan and the Welfare Benefit Plan (Plaintiffs or the Tribe)
brought suit against Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan (BCBSM).
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Plaintiffs’ suit takes issue with BCBSM’s management of Plaintiffs’
“self-insured employee benefit Plan.” The Counts which remain
involve allegations that BCBSM charged Plaintiffs hidden fees. On
April 10, 2017, the parties filed cross motions for partial summary
judgment on the remaining Counts. The motions frame two issues:
whether both of the Tribe’s two benefit plans are subject to the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1001(b), et seq., and whether the fees collected for BCBSM’s
Physician Group Incentive Program (PGIP) violated BCBSM’s
fiduciary duties. ORDERED that, in accordance with Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure 54, 56, and 58, on Count One and Count Two of
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint against Defendants as they relate to
payment of hidden access fees for the Employee Plan, judgment is
entered in favor of Plaintiffs and against the Defendant in the
amount of $8,426,278.
25.

Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians and
its Employee Welfare Plan v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of
Michigan

No. 14-cv-11349, 2017 WL 3116262 (E.D. Mich. Jul. 21, 2017).
This Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) case has
been pending for over three years and is currently before the Court
on defendant Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan’s motion to
dismiss the amended complaint filed by plaintiffs Grand Traverse
Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians and its Employee Welfare
Plan. Plaintiffs are a federally-recognized tribe and have filed suit
against Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan (BCBSM) for breach of
fiduciary duty under ERISA and have also brought five state-law
claims allegedly relating to a contract between the tribe, BCBSM,
and Munson Medical Center. Plaintiffs maintain a self-funded
employee welfare plan (Plan) governed by the ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §
1001 et seq. In 2000, plaintiffs hired BCBSM to “provide
administrative services for the processing and payment of claims”
under the plan. In 2007, new federal regulations implementing
section 506 of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003 went into effect (hereinafter MLR
regulations). These regulations stated that “[a]ll Medicareparticipating hospitals . . . must accept no more than the rates of
payment under the methodology described in this section as
payment in full for all terms and services authorized by IHS, Tribal,
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and urban Indian organization entities.” And “if an amount has been
negotiated with the hospital or its agent,” the tribe “will pay the
lesser of” the amount determined by the methodology or the
negotiated amount. None of the parties’ disputes that these
regulations apply to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs allege that defendant was
“well aware of the MLR regulations” and “systematically failed to
take advantage of MLR discounts available to Plaintiffs.” And “[a]s
administrator of an ERISA plan, BCBSM owed a number of
fiduciary duties” to plaintiff that were breached due to this failure to
take advantage of the MLR discounts. Plaintiffs seek restitution,
statutory attorney fees, and other damages, costs, and interest. For
the reasons set forth above, defendant’s motion to dismiss is
GRANTED as to Count I, Count II, Count III (implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing only), Count IV, Count V, and Count VI.
26.

Enerplus Resources (USA) Corporation, v. Wilbur D.
Wilkinson, et al.

No. 16-3715, 865 F.3d 1094, 2017 WL 3271313 (8th Cir. Aug. 2,
2017). Enerplus Resources (USA) Corporation (Enerplus)
mistakenly overpaid mineral royalties to Wilbur Wilkinson and
demanded a return of the excess funds. In response, Wilkinson sued
Enerplus in tribal court. Enerplus then filed suit in federal court,
seeking the return of the excess funds and a declaration that the tribal
court lacked jurisdiction over the dispute. The district court
preliminarily enjoined Wilkinson from proceeding with his case in
tribal court. Wilkinson appeals. Wilbur Wilkinson sued Peak North
Dakota, LLC (Peak North) in tribal court. Subsequently, on October
4, 2010, Peak North and Wilkinson entered into a “Settlement
Agreement, Full Mutual Release, Waiver of Claims and Covenant
Not to Sue” (Settlement Agreement), whereby Peak North agreed to
assign Wilkinson an overriding royalty interest (ORRI) in certain oil
and gas leases located in North Dakota. Pursuant to the Settlement
Agreement, Peak North and Wilkinson agreed that “any disputes
arising under this Agreement and/or the transactions contemplated
herein shall be resolved in the United States District Court for the
District of North Dakota Northwest Division and such court shall
have exclusive jurisdiction hereunder and no party shall have the
right to contest such jurisdiction or venue.” In December 2010, Peak
North merged with and into Enerplus, with Enerplus being the
surviving entity. Because of an alleged clerical error between
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August 2014 and October 2015, Enerplus claims it overpaid the
ORRI due to Wilkinson by $2,961,511.15. Upon discovering the
error, Enerplus promptly, but unsuccessfully, sought return of the
overpaid funds. On February 29, 2016, Wilkinson sued Enerplus in
the Fort Berthold Tribal Court, alleging Enerplus breached the
Settlement Agreement by underpaying Wilkinson. Enerplus
subsequently brought this action in the federal district court, seeking
(1) a preliminary injunction prohibiting Wilkinson from prosecuting
any lawsuits in tribal court arising from or relating to the Settlement
Agreement and prohibiting the tribal court from exercising
jurisdiction over Enerplus in Wilkinson’s tribal court case, and
(2) an order requiring that the overpaid ORRI be deposited into the
district court’s registry. In response, Wilkinson moved to dismiss,
arguing that (1) the Settlement Agreement is void, (2) Enerplus
failed to exhaust tribal remedies, (3) the tribal court has jurisdiction,
and (4) the requested preliminary injunction should be denied. The
appellate court held that the district court’s preliminary injunction
was “within the range of choice available to the district court,
account[ed] for all relevant factors, d[id] not rely on any irrelevant
factors, and d[id] not constitute a clear error of judgment.”
Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.
D.
27.

Employment

Williams v. Poarch Band of Creek Indians

No. 15-13552, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 18717 (11th Cir. Oct. 18,
2016). Christine J. Williams, the plaintiff below and appellant here,
was employed for more than twenty-one years as the laboratory
manager and chief medical technologist in the Health Department
operated by the Poarch Band of Creek Indians (the Poarch Band), a
federally-recognized tribe of Native Americans. The Department is
located on reservation lands, and positions within it are considered
to be jobs of Tribal government. Plaintiff asserts that her
employment was terminated because of her age (which she
described as “over 55”), and that she was replaced by a 28-year-old
female who “did not have enough experience to be a lab manager.”
Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court,
alleging a single claim of discrimination under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(ADEA). The Poarch Band moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that
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the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity deprived the court of
subject matter jurisdiction. The Magistrate Judge to whom the action
originally was assigned entered a report recommending that the
motion be granted. Plaintiff’s objections were overruled by the
District Court Judge, who adopted the Magistrate’s Report and
Recommendation and dismissed the case. This appeal followed. The
appellate court held that: (1) There was no evidence that the Tribe
waived its immunity, either generally or in the present suit; (2) The
Fitzpatrick decision did not assist her in her argument that a
comparison of the term employer found in Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 with the ADEA’s definition of that same term
demonstrated that Congress intended to abrogate tribal immunity
when enacting the ADEA; (3) The silence of the statutory text of the
ADEA and its legislative history on the issue of whether Congress
intended it apply to Indian tribes was ambiguous; (4) One could
conclude that Congress never considered the ADEA’s impact upon
Indian tribes; (5) The weight of authority in the federal courts
supported upholding the right of the Tribe to tribal sovereign
immunity from a claim based upon the ADEA. The court ruled that
the Poarch Band is entitled to tribal sovereign immunity from
plaintiff’s ADEA claim and affirmed the district court’s decision to
grant the Poarch Band’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction. Affirmed.
28.

Window Rock Unified School District et. al. v. Reeves et. al.

No. 13-16259, No. 13-16278, 861 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. Jun. 28, 2017).
Public school districts that operated schools on land leased from
Indian tribe brought action seeking declaratory judgment that tribal
labor commission lacked jurisdiction over their employment
decisions and practices conducted on reservation, and injunction to
bar prosecution of their employees’ claims against them in tribal
courts. The District Court, No. 3:12-cv-08059, 2013 WL 1149706,
entered summary judgment in districts’ favor, and commission and
employees appealed. The appellate court held that districts were
required to exhaust their tribal remedies before seeking relief in
federal court. Reversed and remanded.
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E.
29.

Environmental Regulations

Battle Mt. Band v. United States BLM

No. 3:16-CV-0268-LRH-WGC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115093 (D.
Nev. Aug. 25, 2016). Before the court was plaintiff the Battle
Mountain Band of the Te-Moak Tribe of Western Shoshone Indians’
(Band) renewed motion for a temporary restraining order which the
court construed as a motion for a preliminary injunction. Defendants
the United States Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and Jill C.
Silvey (collectively defendants), along with intervenor Carlin
Resources, Inc. (Carlin), filed oppositions to the motion. This action
involves the various agency decisions and federal permits issued by
the BLM authorizing the construction of a power transmission line
on land located in Elko County, Nevada that has been identified by
the Band as its traditional cultural property (TCP) and has recently
been deemed eligible by the BLM for inclusion on the National
Register of Historic Places (National Register). Plaintiff Battle
Mountain Band is one of four bands that comprise and make up the
Te-Moak Tribe of Western Shoshone Indians (Te-Moak Tribe), a
federally recognized Indian tribe. The Band currently resides on
colony lands in close proximity to the Tosawihi Quarries. The Band
contends that the entirety of the quarries, including the specific
TCPs at issue in this action, are a vital spiritual, cultural, and
economic center for the Band and other member bands of the TeMoak Tribe. According to the Band, the quarries contain various
TCPs like sacred sites, burial grounds, ceremonial locations,
spiritual trails, and hunting grounds as well as, medicinal and natural
resources central to its history, culture, and identity. Defendant
BLM is the federal agency responsible for overseeing and
administering public lands, including the public lands on which the
Tosawihi Quarries and the identified TCPs exist. As part of its
administration of these lands, the BLM is authorized to issue permits
and leases for use of the land. Approximately eight years ago,
Carlin’s predecessors-in-interest applied for a permit from the BLM
to convert certain land in the quarries from an exploratory mining
area into a functional mining operation. Carlin, as the current owner
of the mining rights, is the interested party to the various agency
decisions and federal permits issued by the BLM. The Band argues
that the public has a strong interest in the protection of historic
property because Congress mandated a specific procedure for
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federal agencies to follow as outlined in the National Historic
Preservation Act (NHPA). The court agrees. However, the court
notes that there is a comparable public interest in the protection of a
business’ reasonable investment-backed expectations when
involved with government agencies. This public interest would be
disserved by allowing the Band to attack a lengthy, expensive, and
complex NHPA process years after the conclusion of the Record of
Decision (ROD) and after an interested party like Carlin has
invested millions of dollars in the project under that approved ROD.
Further, the public’s interest in protecting historic properties was
successfully engaged in during the Section 106 process.
Accordingly, the court shall deny the Battle Mountain Band’s
motion for preliminary injunctive relief.
30.

Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. United States Army
Corps of Eng’rs

No. 16-1534 (JEB), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121997 (D.D.C. Sept.
9, 2016). The Standing Rock Sioux Tribe sued the United States
Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) to block the operation of Corps
permitting for the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL). The Tribe fears
that construction of the pipeline, which runs within half a mile of its
reservation in North and South Dakota, will destroy sites of cultural
and historical significance. It filed a Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, asserting principally that the Corps flouted its duty to
engage in tribal consultations under the National Historic
Preservation Act (NHPA) and that irreparable harm will ensue. The
court concluded that the Corps likely complied with the NHPA and
that the Tribe has not shown it will suffer injury that would be
prevented by any injunction the Court could issue. The Motion was
denied.
31.

Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate of the Lake Traverse Reservation
v. United States Corps of Eng’rs

No. 3:11-CV-03026-RAL, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134399 (D.S.D.
Sep. 29, 2016). Plaintiffs Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate of the Lake
Traverse Reservation (Tribe) and Robert Shepherd, the Tribe’s thenChairman, filed a Complaint and Amended Complaint seeking
declaratory, injunctive, and other relief. Plaintiffs named as
Defendants the United States Corps of Engineers (Corps), Steven E.
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Naylor, in his official capacity as Regulatory Program Manager, and
Robert J. Ruch, in his official capacity as District Commander.
Plaintiffs’ Complaint challenged the Corps granting of certain
exemptions and permits under the Clean Water Act (CWA) to
Merlyn Drake (Drake), and how it has dealt generally with Drake’s
requests and conduct on land adjacent to Enemy Swim Lake, which
is within the exterior boundaries of the Tribe’s reservation. This
lawsuit centered on the Tribe’s concern about development at
Enemy Swim Lake within the Lake Traverse Reservation in South
Dakota. The Tribe considers Enemy Swim Lake (Toka Nuwan
Yapi) to be of tremendous cultural and religious significance. There
are burial grounds at and near the lake, plants from the lake are used
in ceremonies and for medicinal purposes, some tribal members
spear and catch fish for sustenance from the lake, and many tribal
members consider Enemy Swim Lake to be a sacred place. The land
surrounding the lake is owned by the Tribe, tribal members, and
non-tribal members. Drake, who is not a member of the Tribe, owns
land adjoining Enemy Swim Lake. Drake has been constructing the
farm roads and bridge, which are approximately one mile in length
and travel through an inlet to and crossing near the shoreline of
Enemy Swim Lake. Certain of Drake’s prior receipt of exemptions
and permits for activities on this property challenged in this
litigation were time barred or otherwise dismissed. The remaining
issues in this case involve certain exemptions and permits under the
CWA received in 2006 and 2009 by Drake from the Corps relating
to excavation and extraction activities to create farm roads and a
bridge to improve access to a portion of Drake’s land. The Court
denied Plaintiffs’ request for an injunction against the Corps,
remanded to the Corps for reconsideration whether the 2009 gully
crossings were the type of undertaking that could affect historic
properties under 36 C.F.R. § 800.3(a) and to complete the Section
106 process if so necessary, and denied all other requests for relief
requested by Plaintiffs.
32.

Karuk Tribe v. Stelle

No. 16-15818, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 21637 (9th Cir. Dec. 5,
2016). Karuk Tribe and various environmental organizations
invoked the provisions of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16
U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2), and the National Forest Management Act
(NFMA), 16 U.S.C. § 1604(i); 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(e), to seek a
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preliminary injunction blocking the government’s salvage logging
in a large burned area of the Klamath National Forest. The district
court denied the preliminary injunction, and the logging project,
known as the Westside Fire Recovery Project, continues to go
forward. Plaintiffs appeal. We review the denial for abuse of
discretion. There was none. The salvage logging has been
undertaken to reduce the likelihood of more severe fires in the
future. Plaintiffs’ concern is with the loss of snags that are beneficial
to owl and salmon habitats. The government was required, under the
NFMA, to comply with the Klamath Forest Plan that spells out
requirements for the retention of snags. The project met those
requirements. The government’s efforts to preserve large snags
included (1) retaining large “legacy” green trees; (2) leaving
untouched snags in hydrologic riparian areas; (3) designating
additional snag retention areas; and (4) reducing surface fuels,
which decreases the risk that future fire consumes even more snags.
Plaintiffs rely on our decision in Oregon Nat. Res. Council Fund v.
Brong, 492 F.3d 1120, 1126 (9th Cir. 2007), where we affirmed the
entry of an injunction to prevent snag removal by means of clear
cutting on a large scale and undertaken for governmental profit.
Here, the Forest Service’s motives are to prevent the danger of
future fires, not economic gain, and the government has gone to
pains to avoid the risks of large-scale clear cutting envisioned in
Brong. Assuming that Plaintiffs have raised serious questions
concerning the logging in riparian reserves under the NFMA, the
equities favor the government because of the long term
environmental, safety and economic benefits. See Earth Island Inst.
v. Carlton, 626 F.3d 462, 475 (9th Cir. 2010). With respect to the
ESA, National Marine Fisheries Service did not rely significantly, if
at all, on the Forest Service’s planned mitigation measures in
reaching its no jeopardy conclusion. Plaintiffs cannot show a
likelihood of success under the ESA. AFFIRMED.
33.

Quechan Tribe of the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation v.
United States DOI

No. 13-55704, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 22919 (9th Cir. Dec. 21,
2016). HOLDINGS: (1) The Bureau of Land Management (BLM)
did not improperly fail to determine whether a proposed wind
energy facility met the substantive requirements of a desert
conservation area plan since the BLM properly amended the plan to
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accommodate the project, and the project was governed by the plan
amendment rather than the plan itself; (2) The project was properly
assigned an interim classification for the least restrictive amount of
permissible change to the existing character of the landscape since
the classification was included in the properly adopted amendment
to the plan; (3) The BLM did not fail to consider the cumulative
impacts of alternative energy projects on lands in the desert
conservation area since the BLM sufficiently assessed the effects on
visual and cultural resources, identified reasonably foreseeable
future projects, and described the existing damage to cultural
resources. Judgment affirmed.
34.

Quinault Indian Nation v. Imperium Terminal Services,
LLC

No. 92552-6, 387 P.3d 670 (Wash. Jan. 12, 2017). Owners of
terminals for storing petroleum products applied for substantial
shoreline development permit (SSDP) based on plans to expand
their operations. After the Department of Ecology (DOE) and the
city issued mitigated determinations of nonsignificance (MDNS)
and permits, a Native American tribe and citizens groups appealed.
The Shoreline Hearings Board granted motions for partial summary
judgment. Tribe and citizens group appealed to the Court of
Appeals, which accepted direct review. The appellate court, 190
Wash. App. 696, 360 P.3d 949, affirmed Board’s grant of summary
judgment. Tribe and citizens group sought review by Supreme
Court, which was granted. The Supreme Court held that:
(1) owners’ proposed expansion projects, which would facilitate the
storage of additional fuel products that would arrive by train or truck
and depart by ocean-bound ship, triggered review of owners’ permit
applications under Ocean Resources Management Act’s (ORMA)
statutory framework; (2) owners’ proposed expansion projects
qualified as “ocean uses” as defined in DOE’s regulation
implementing ORMA; (3) owners’ proposed expansion projects
qualified as “transportation” as defined in DOE’s regulation
implementing ORMA; and (4) owners’ proposed expansion projects
qualified as “coastal uses” as defined in DOE’s regulation
implementing ORMA. Reversed and remanded.
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35.

Protect Our Communities Foundation v. Black

No. 14cv2261 JLS (JMA), 2017 WL 882278 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 6,
2017). Presently before the Court are Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Summary Judgment. Tule Wind LLC plans to construct a number of
wind turbines in southeastern San Diego County. The project
consists of two phases. Phase I involves sixty-five turbines on
federal land in the McCain Valley, and Phase II comprises twenty
turbines on land held in trust for the Ewiiaapaayp Band of
Kumeyaay Indians (the Tribe) on ridgelines above the McCain
Valley. The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) approved Phase I
in 2011. This lawsuit pertains to BIA’s approval of Phase II. In
2011—prior to approval of either phase—BLM issued a Final
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) pursuant to the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and its implementing
regulations. Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) served as a cooperating
agency on the EIS, which therefore permitted BIA to “use the
EIR/EIS for [its own] approval processes” and “for consideration of
[its own] required discretionary actions.” Although BIA ultimately
adopted several eagle-specific mitigation measures in authorizing
Phase II, determining that the adopted mitigation “scenario
significantly reduces potential ‘take’ of golden eagles during
operation for the life of the Proposed Action[,]” and that Phase II
“would not create significant impacts after the implementation of
mitigation measures contained in the [record of decision] (ROD)
and the acquisition of all permits required by law.” In authorizing
Phase II, the BIA considered the EIS, the “overall administrative
record,” and “BIA’s mission to foster economic development for
tribes.” The court found that because (1) the BIA permissibly relied
on the 2011 Environmental Impact Statement, which it helped
prepare; (2) the 2011 EIS rigorously considered Tule Phase II’s
potential risk to golden eagles; and (3) no new information or
developments triggered NEPA’s supplementation requirements, the
Court concludes that BIA validly exercised its discretion in
approving Tule Phase II. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS
Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment and DENIES
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment.
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36.

Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. United States Army
Corps of Eng’rs

No. 16-1534 (JEB), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31967 (D.D.C. Mar. 7,
2017). Since last summer, the question of whether Dakota Access
should route its oil pipeline near the reservations of American Indian
tribes has engendered substantial debate both on the ground in North
and South Dakota and here in Washington. This Court, meanwhile,
has focused on the specific legal challenges raised by the Standing
Rock and Cheyenne River Sioux Tribes in their efforts to block
government permitting of the pipeline. See Standing Rock Sioux
Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Standing Rock I), 2016 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 121997, 2016 WL 4734356 (D.D.C. Sept. 9, 2016). At
the start of 2017, that pipeline was nearly complete, save a stretch,
awaiting an easement, that was designed to run under the bed of
Lake Oahe, a federally regulated waterway that forms part of the
Missouri River and straddles North and South Dakota. Upon
assuming office, President Trump directed an expedited approval
process, and on February 8, the Army Corps of Engineers issued the
easement that permitted Dakota Access to drill under the lake.
Fearing that the presence of oil in the pipeline under Lake Oahe will
cause irreparable harm to its members’ religious exercise, Cheyenne
River responded with a Motion for Preliminary Injunction, in which
it argues that the easement’s grant violates the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq., and requests that the
Court enjoin the effect of the easement and thus the flow of oil,
which is expected to commence in the next week or two. As the
Court concludes that the extraordinary relief requested is not
appropriate in light of both the equitable doctrine of laches and the
Tribe’s unlikelihood of success on the merits, it will deny the
Motion.
37.

Round Valley Indian Tribes of Cal. v. United States DOT

No. 15-cv-04987-JSW, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34923 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 10, 2017). This litigation arises out of a highway project that
is under construction around the community of Willits, California
(the Willits Bypass Project). Plaintiffs, the Coyote Valley Band of
Pomo Indians of California (Coyote Valley) and the Round Valley
Indian Tribes of California (Round Valley) (collectively Plaintiffs),
allege the Federal Defendants violated the National Environmental
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Protection Act (NEPA), Section 4(f) of the Department of
Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. section 303(f) (Section 4(f)), Section
18(a) of the Federal-Aid Highway Act, 23 U.S.C. section 138
(Section 18(a)), and the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA).
On July 1, 2007, the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA)
entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with
defendant California Department of Transportation (Caltrans), in
which the FHWA assigned certain responsibilities and liabilities for
various projects, including the Willits Bypass Project, to Caltrans,
pursuant to the Surface Transportation Project Pilot Delivery
Program (the Pilot Program), 23 U.S.C. section 327. However,
Caltrans did not assume the Federal Defendants’ responsibilities for
government-to-government consultation under the NHPA. Plaintiffs
allege all Defendants, including the Federal Defendants: (1) failed
to properly identify and protect the Plaintiffs’ “ancestral, sacred,
cultural, and archeological sites and resources;” and (2) destroyed
certain sites during the construction of the Willits Bypass Project.
Plaintiffs also allege all Defendants, including the Federal
Defendants, failed to “(a) adequately address the direct, indirect, and
cumulative cultural, environmental, and historic impacts of the
Willits Bypass Project; (b) identify and finalize the details of the
mitigation plan or its environmental and cultural impacts; and
(c) commit to necessary mitigation measures.” On October 30,
2015, Plaintiffs filed the original complaint in this case. On August
2, 2016, the Court granted the Federal Defendants’ motion to
dismiss. The Court concluded that the terms of the MOU would bar
Plaintiffs’ claims under NEPA and Section 4(f) and Section 18(a).
The Court gave Plaintiffs leave to amend, and it directed Plaintiffs
to specifically identify which Defendant acted, or failed to act, in a
particular manner. On August 24, 2016, Plaintiffs filed the first
amended complaint (FAC). In sum, the Court concludes Plaintiffs
have alleged facts to state a claim based on alleged failure to engage
in a government-to-government consultation process under NHPA.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the Court grants, in part, and
denies, in part the Federal Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
38.

Hopi Tribe v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

No. 14-73055, 2017 WL 1046116, 851 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. Mar. 20,
2017). Indian tribe petitioned for review of Environmental
Protection Agency’s (EPA) federal implementation plan under the
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Clean Air Act (CAA) for reduction of emissions from a coal-fired
generating station, which tribe contended would result in the plant’s
closure with resulting harm to tribe’s economic interests. The
Appellate Court held that EPA did not violate any duty of the
Government to consult with Indian tribe during rulemaking process.
Petition denied.
39.

Yazzie v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

No. 14-73100, No. 14-73101, No. 14-73102, 2017 WL 1046117,
851 F.3d 960 (9th Cir. Mar. 20, 2017). Tribal conservation
organizations and non-profit environmental organizations petitioned
for review of United States Environmental Protection Agency’s
(EPA) source-specific federal implementation plan (FIP) under the
Clean Air Act (CAA) for a coal-fired power plant on the Navajo
Nation Reservation in Arizona. The Appellate Court held that:
(1) federal government’s partial ownership of power plant did not
weigh against affording deference to EPA’s interpretation of CAA
and its implementing regulations; (2) EPA’s determination that
Tribal Authority Rule (TAR) applied to Navajo Nation was
reasonable; (3) FIP was not subject to CAA regional haze program’s
requirement that all necessary emission reductions take place during
the period of the first long-term strategy for regional haze; (4) EPA
was not required to show by clear weight of the evidence that its FIP
was better than best alternative retrofit technology (BART);
(5) EPA’s interpretation of phrase “distribution of emissions” as
used in Regional Haze Regulation was reasonable; and (6) it was
reasonable for EPA to give plant emission credit when evaluating
whether FIP alternative resulted in greater emissions reductions than
the BART. Petition denied.
40.

Navajo Nation v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co.

No. CV-17-8007-PCT-DLR, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77568 (D.
Ariz. May 22, 2017). The Navajo Nation filed an unopposed motion
to enter the parties’ proposed consent decree (CD). The United
States filed a similar motion in its related suit against Defendants.
(No. CV-17-00140-DLR.) The Court granted the motions, finding
the CD to be fair, reasonable, and consistent with the objectives of
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA). The United States, on behalf of the
Administrator of the United States Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), filed a complaint in this matter pursuant to Sections
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106 and 107 of the CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606 and 9607, against
Cyprus Amax Minerals Company (Cyprus Amax) and Western
Nuclear, Inc. (Western Nuclear) (collectively, Settling Defendants).
The Navajo Nation filed a complaint in this matter pursuant to
Section 107 of CERCLA and Sections 2403, 2501 and 2503 of the
Navajo Nation CERCLA (NNCERCLA), 4 N.N.C. §§ 2403, 2501
and 2503, against Settling Defendants. The United States and the
Navajo Nation (collectively, Plaintiffs), in their complaint against
the Settling Defendants, each seek, inter alia: (1) reimbursement of
Past and Future Response Costs incurred, in the case of the United
States, by EPA and other federal agencies, and in the case of the
Navajo Nation, by the Navajo Nation, including the Navajo Nation
EPA (NNEPA) and the Navajo Nation DOJ (NNDOJ), for response
actions at the abandoned uranium mine sites and one transfer station
in Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah, located on Navajo Nation lands,
and listed in Appendix A (Mine Sites), together with accrued
interest; and (2) performance of response actions by Settling
Defendants at the Mine Sites consistent with the National
Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R. Part 300 (NCP). Settling Defendants
do not admit any liability to Plaintiffs arising out of the transactions
or occurrences alleged in the complaints, do not admit that any
release or threatened release of hazardous substances occurred while
they operated any Mine Site, nor do they acknowledge that the
release or threatened release of hazardous substance(s) at or from
any of the Mine Sites constitutes an imminent and substantial
endangerment to the public health or welfare or the environment.
Settling Federal Agencies do not admit any liability arising out of
the transactions or occurrences as may be alleged in any claims by
the Navajo Nation or counterclaims by Settling Defendants. Based
on the information presently available to EPA and the Navajo
Nation, EPA and the Navajo Nation believe that the Work at the
Mine Sites will be promptly conducted by Settling Defendants if
conducted in accordance with this CD and its appendices. The
Parties recognize, and the Court by entering this CD finds, that this
CD has been negotiated by the Parties in good faith and
implementation of this CD will expedite the cleanup of the Mine
Sites and will avoid prolonged and complicated litigation between
the Parties, and that this CD is fair, reasonable, and in the public
interest.
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F.

Fisheries, Water, FERC, BOR

41.

United States v. Washington

No. 13-35474, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 3816, 853 F.3d 946 (9th Cir.
Mar. 2, 2017). The panel amended the opinion filed on June 27,
2016, and affirmed the district court’s order issuing an injunction
directing the State of Washington to correct culverts, which allow
streams to flow underneath roads, because they violated, and
continued to violate, the Stevens Treaties, which were entered in
1854-55 between Indian tribes in the Pacific Northwest and the
Governor of Washington Territory. In 1970, the United States
brought suit against the State of Washington on behalf of the Tribes
to resolve a persistent conflict over fishing rights; and in a 1974
decision, the district court authorized the parties to invoke its
continuing jurisdiction to resolve continuing disputes. The panel
held that in building and maintaining barrier culverts within the Case
Area, Washington violated, and was continuing to violate, its
obligation to the Tribes under the Treaties. The panel also held that
because treaty rights belong to the Tribes rather than the United
States, it was not the prerogative of the United States to waive them.
Concerning the State of Washington’s cross-request seeking an
injunction that would require the United States to fix its culverts
before Washington repaired its culverts, the panel held that
Washington’s cross-request was barred by sovereign immunity, and
Washington did not have standing to assert any treaty rights
belonging to the Tribes. Specifically, the panel held that
Washington’s cross-request for an injunction did not qualify as
a claim for recoupment. The panel held that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in enjoining Washington to correct most of its
high-priority barrier culverts within seventeen years, and to correct
the remainder at the end of their natural life or in the course of a road
construction project undertaken for independent reasons. The panel
rejected Washington’s objections that the injunction was too broad,
that the district court did not defer to the State’s expertise, that the
court did not properly consider costs and equitable principles, that
the injunction impermissibly intruded into state government
operations, and that the injunction was inconsistent with federalism
principles. Judgment affirmed.
42.

Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella
Valley Water District

No. 15-55896, 849 F.3d 1262 (9th Cir. Mar. 7, 2017). Indian tribe
brought action against water district and desert water agency,
seeking to have the court declare and quantify its federally reserved
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rights to groundwater underlying its reservation and enjoin district
and agency from interfering with tribe’s rights to groundwater.
Federal government intervened as a plaintiff. The District Court, No.
5:13-cv-00883-JGB-SP, 2015 WL 1600065, entered partial
summary judgment in favor of tribe and government. District and
agency appealed. The Appellate Court held that: (1) federal
government impliedly reserved general water right when it
established Indian reservation in desert; (2) tribe’s implied general
reserved water right extended to groundwater; and (3) any state
water entitlements that tribe had to groundwater did not limit tribe’s
federal implied water right. Affirmed.
43.

Skokomish Indian Tribe v. Forsman

No. C16-5639 RBL, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42730 (W.D. Wash.
Mar. 23, 2017). Before the Court was Defendant Suquamish Indian
Tribe and its Tribal Councilmembers’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff
Skokomish Indian Tribe’s claims against them. Skokomish Tribe
sued Councilmembers and Fisheries Director of the Suquamish
Tribe, alleging they violated Skokomish’s hunting rights by
allowing their tribal members to hunt in Skokomish’s territory.
Skokomish claims the Point No Point Treaty reserved to it the
primary and exclusive hunting right within “Twana Territory.” The
Skokomish Tribe is a successor in interest to the Skokomish and
Twana people. The 1855 Treaty of Point No Point is one of several
treaties executed by Governor Stevens reserving hunting and fishing
rights to its signatory tribes (the Stevens Treaties). In 1985, this
Court confirmed Skokomish’s primary fishing right in Twana
Territory, roughly, Hood Canal. Skokomish argues the Court also
confirmed its primary hunting right in Twana Territory. Skokomish
alleges Defendants unlawfully promulgated and enforced hunting
regulations allowing Suquamish hunting in Twana Territory. It
seeks declaratory and injunctive relief confirming its primary
hunting right and enjoining the Suquamish Tribe’s enforcement of
unlawful hunting in Twana Territory. Defendants seek dismissal of
Skokomish’s claims on four grounds: (1) Skokomish lacks
Article III standing, (2) the suit against the Suquamish Tribe is
barred by sovereign immunity, (3) legislative immunity precludes
suit against Suquamish Tribal Officials promulgating hunting
regulations, and (4) Skokomish failed to join the Suquamish Tribe
and other Stevens Treaty Tribes as indispensable parties.
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Defendants point out that Skokomish recently sued a host of state
officials, asserting the same claims and seeking similar relief, in
Skokomish Indian Tribe v. Goldmark, 944 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1193
(W.D. Wash. 2014). Judge Robart dismissed that case because the
adjudication of the signatory tribes’ hunting rights in the region
required Skokomish to join all of the tribes in one action, which it
could not do. Skokomish argues this Court has jurisdiction because
Defendant’s unlawful hunting caused a concrete injury, redressable
by a favorable judgment of this Court. Skokomish also argues Ex
Parte Young, an exception to the Suquamish Tribe’s sovereign
immunity, allows this Court to grant injunctive relief enjoining the
Suquamish Tribal Officers’ unlawful acts. It argues that legislative
immunity does not bar the suit because Suquamish Tribal Officers
acted in their administrative and executive, not legislative,
capacities in passing and enforcing hunting regulations. The Court
granted Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Skokomish’s failure to
join indispensable parties. Skokomish’s claims were dismissed
without prejudice.
44.

Wild Fish Conservancy, et al. v. National Park Service, et
al.

No. 14-35791, 2017 WL 1381128, 687 Fed. Appx. 554 (9th Cir.
Apr. 18, 2017). In a series of decisions, the Department of the
Interior and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS)
approved the use of hatcheries operated by the State of Washington
and the Lower Elwha Klallam Tribe (the Tribe) to restore Elwha
River fish populations after a dam removal project. The Wild Fish
Conservancy and others (collectively, the Conservancy) claim in
this action that the Department and NMFS violated the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Endangered Species Act
(ESA) and that the Tribe's hatchery operations were “taking”
threatened fish in violation of the ESA. The district court correctly
held that NMFS's decision to prepare an Environmental Assessment
(EA) instead of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) before
approving the hatchery programs under Limit 6 was neither arbitrary
nor capricious. See Native Ecosystems Council v. U.S. Forest Serv.,
428 F.3d 1233, 1238–39 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining standard of
review). The Department had previously endorsed the use of
hatcheries in the Elwha River in a 1996 EIS and decision. See Or.
Nat. Res. Council v. Lyng, 882 F.2d 1417, 1424 (9th Cir. 1989)
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(finding supplemental EIS not required where previous EIS and
comprehensive management plan “had already contemplated”
agency actions “of the type and magnitude proposed”). The
subsequent EA reasonably concluded, after thorough analysis, that
the risks posed by the hatchery programs were minimal and that
approving the programs would have no significant impact on the
environment. Because the EA satisfied NMFS's NEPA obligations,
it also satisfied the Department's NEPA obligations. The
Department participated in preparing the EA, and the EA expressly
considered the effects of the Department's funding actions. The
district court correctly found the Conservancy's initial claim that the
Tribe was taking fish without authorization moot in light of NMFS's
Limit 6 approval and Incidental Take Statement.
45.

United States v. Washington

No. 13-35474, 2017 WL 2193387 (9th Cir. May 19, 2017). The
panel denied a petition for a panel rehearing and denied a petition
for rehearing en banc on behalf of the court in an action in which the
panel affirmed the district court’s injunction directing the State of
Washington to correct culverts, which allow streams to flow
underneath roads, because they violated, and continued to violate,
the Stevens Treaties, which were entered in 1854–55 between Indian
tribes in the Pacific Northwest and the Governor of Washington
Territory. Concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc, Judges W.
Fletcher and Gould stated that the district court properly found that
Washington State violated the Treaties by acting affirmatively to
build state-owned roads, and to build and maintain salmon-blocking
culverts under those roads. The Judges stated that there is ample
evidence that remediation of the State’s barrier culverts will have a
substantial beneficial effect on salmon populations, resulting in
more harvestable salmon for the Tribes. As an incidental result,
there will also be more harvestable salmon for non-Indians. The
district court crafted a careful, nuanced injunction, giving the United
States much less than it requested. The Judges stated that the district
court properly found a violation of the Treaties by the State, and that
it acted within its discretion in formulating its remedial injunction.
In an opinion respecting the denial of rehearing en banc, Judge
O’Scannlain, joined by Judges Kozinski, Tallman, Callahan, Bea,
Ikuta and N.R. Smith, and joined by Judges Bybee and M. Smith as
to all but Part IV, stated that the panel opinion’s reasoning ignored
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the Supreme Court’s holding in Washington v. Washington State
Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Association, 443 U.S. 658
(1979), and this Circuit’s cases, was incredibly broad, and if left
unchecked, could significantly affect natural resource management
throughout the Pacific Northwest, inviting judges to become
environmental regulators. Judge O’Scannlain stated that by refusing
to consider the doctrine of laches, the panel opinion further
disregarded the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Sherrill v.
Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 544 U.S. 197 (2005). The
petition for rehearing and the petition for rehearing en banc, filed
August 11, 2016, are DENIED.
46.

Crow Creek Sioux Tribe v. United States

No. 16-760 C, 132 Fed. Cl. 408, 2017 U.S. Claims LEXIS 604 (Fed.
Cl. June 1, 2017). Plaintiff Crow Creek sued the United States
through the Department of the Interior alleging a Fifth Amendment
taking of its reserved water rights. See Winters v. United States, 207
U.S. 564, 576-78, 28 S. Ct. 207, 52 L. Ed. 340 (1908). Defendant
filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. Defendant also contends that the
Government’s bare trust relationship with Crow Creek does not
provide the “money-mandating” statute or regulation necessary for
jurisdiction in this court. See United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392,
400 (1976). Plaintiff’s pleadings do not show how damages from an
alleged taking could have accrued currently, and oral arguments did
not clarify this threshold issue. Nevertheless, plaintiff urged the
court to permit sufficient discovery for it to address defendant’s
jurisdictional arguments. Given the opportunity to inquire into the
extent of defendant’s diversion of its rights in the waters of the
Missouri River, the Tribe argued it would be able to definitively
establish damages. For example, counsel stated during oral
arguments that plaintiff could hire experts to submit reports on
various methods of obtaining appraised values for those waters.
Plaintiff believes that those values would supply evidence of the
damages that its case now lacks. In this case, however, opening
discovery in response to defendant’s motion to dismiss would result
in a waste of resources for both parties. The jurisdictional problem
of standing or ripeness arises from plaintiff’s inability to identify an
injury to the Tribe that has yet occurred. If we were to permit
discovery for the purposes that plaintiff proposes, that effort could
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only establish the value of water that has been diverted from the
Missouri River over a period of time. Such a value would not equate
to damages suffered by the Tribe in the circumstances of this case.
For these reasons, we GRANT defendant’s motion to dismiss
pursuant to Court of Federal Claims Rule 12(b)(1).
47.

Penobscot Nation v. Mills

Nos. 16-1424, 16-1435, 16-1474, 16-1482, 861 F.3d 324 (1st Cir.
Jun. 30, 2017). American Indian tribe brought action against state of
Maine and various state officials, in response to opinion of state
attorney general regarding regulatory jurisdiction of tribe and state
related to hunting and fishing on stretch of river, seeking declaratory
judgment clarifying boundaries of tribe’s reservation and tribal
fishing rights on river. United States intervened on its own behalf
and as a trustee for tribe, and private interests, towns and other
political entities intervened in support of state defendants. The
District Court, 151 F. Supp. 3d 181, ruled that tribe’s reservation
included river’s islands but not its waters, and sustenance fishing
rights provided in reservation’s implementing statute allowed tribe
to take fish for sustenance in entirety of relevant stretch of river, and
issued declaratory relief as to both points. Parties cross-appealed.
The appellate court held that: (1) under Maine Indian Claims
Settlement Act (MICSA), Penobscot Indian Reservation included
only islands in the main stem of the Penobscot River which were
included in Maine Implementing Act (MIA), but did not include any
of the waters of the River itself, any portion thereof, or the
submerged lands underneath; (2) tribe lacked Article III standing to
bring claim seeking declaratory judgment clarifying tribal fishing
rights on river; and (3) tribe’s claim against defendants, seeking
declaratory judgment clarifying tribal fishing rights on stretch of
river, was not ripe for adjudication. Affirmed in part and vacated in
part.
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G.
48.

Gaming

United Auburn Indian Cmty. of the Auburn Rancheria v.
Brown

No. C075126, 2016 Cal. App. LEXIS 858 (Ct. App. Oct. 13, 2016).
[See also Citizens for a Better Way v. Brown, No. C075018, 2016
Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7409 (Ct. App. Oct. 13, 2016)]. In 2002
the Enterprise Rancheria of Maidu Indians of California (Enterprise
Tribe) submitted a request to the United States Department of the
Interior (Department) to acquire a site in Yuba County for the
purpose of establishing a casino/hotel resort complex. Pursuant to
statute, the Secretary was authorized to acquire land, within or
without an existing reservation, for the purpose of providing land
for Indians. The Governor gave his concurrence and simultaneously
executed a tribal-state gaming compact for the Yuba County site. A
competing gaming establishment, the plaintiff and appellant, which
is owned by the United Auburn Indian Community of the Auburn
Rancheria (Auburn Tribe), challenged the validity of the Governor’s
concurrence on the ground it constituted an illegal exercise of
legislative power, which was neither delegated to the Governor, nor
ancillary and incidental to his power to enter into gaming compacts
with Indian tribes. The court disagreed on the ground the exercise of
the power of concurrence is not legislative. The Auburn Tribe
argued that even though federal law singles out the Governor as the
arm of the state that must concur in the Secretary’s determination
under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) that land acquired
after 1988 is suitable for Indian gaming, no state law authorizes the
Governor to so act. The Auburn Tribe maintains that such action is
a legislative act that must be performed by the Legislature unless
delegated to the Governor. The Auburn Tribe argued that the
Governor’s power to concur with the Secretary’s determination that
land acquired after 1988 is suitable for gaming, is not necessary to
the Governor’s authority to negotiate and conclude class III gaming
compacts. Therefore, it argued the power to concur cannot be said
to be ancillary or incidental to the Governor’s legislative
authorization to enter into class III gaming compacts with Indian
tribes. The court took issue with the Auburn Tribe’s underlying
premise that the power to concur in the Secretary’s determination is
clearly a legislative power. Nothing about the Governor’s
concurrence defeated or materially impaired this function. The
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Governor’s power to concur has the characteristics of an executive,
rather than a legislative act, thus the Governor’s power does not
depend on legislative delegation. The court concluded that the
Governor’s concurrence did not violate the separation of powers
clause and also concluded that the concurrence is not a project under
the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) because the
Governor is not a public agency. The appellate court affirmed the
judgment.
49.

Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida

No. 4:15cv516-RH/CAS, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155708 (N.D. Fla.
Nov. 9, 2016). The Seminole Tribe of Florida operates casinos under
a Compact entered into with the State of Florida under the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (IGRA). The
Compact became effective in 2010 and has a 20-year term. The
Compact authorizes the Tribe to conduct banked card games,
blackjack, for example, only during the first five years. That period
has now ended. But there is an exception to the five-year limitation.
The limitation does not apply, the Tribe may continue to conduct
banked card games for the entire 20-year term, if “the State permits
any other person [except another tribe] to conduct such games.” The
Tribe and the State have filed lawsuits against one another that have
been consolidated. The cases present two central issues: whether the
exception to the five-year limitation has been triggered; and whether
the State has breached a duty under IGRA to negotiate in good faith
for a modification of the Compact. This order declares that the
exception has been triggered—that the Tribe may conduct banked
card games for the Compact’s 20-year term. The order awards no
further relief on the failure-to-negotiate claim.
50.

Stand Up For Cal.! v. State of Cal.

No. F069302, 2016 Cal. App. LEXIS 1078 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 12,
2016). Plaintiffs Stand Up for California! and Barbara Leach
initiated this litigation by filing a complaint challenging the
Governor’s authority to concur in the decision of the Secretary of
the United States Department of the Interior to take land in Madera
County into trust for defendant North Fork Rancheria of Mono
Indians for the purpose of operating a casino for class III gaming.
The Governor’s concurrence was a necessary element under federal
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law for the granting of permission to North Fork to operate the
casino on the land. While the case was pending, the Legislature
passed a statute ratifying a compact previously negotiated and
executed with North Fork by the Governor. This compact is a device
authorized by federal law to allow a state to agree with an Indian
tribe on the terms and conditions under which gambling can take
place on Indian land within the state. Plaintiffs then initiated
Proposition 48, a referendum by which, at the 2014 general election,
the voters disapproved the ratification statute. The result was that
the land remained in trust for North Fork, but the compact was not
ratified, so class III gaming on the land was not approved.
Subsequently, however, as a product of federal litigation between
North Fork and the state, a set of procedures designed to function as
an alternative to a state-approved compact was approved by the
Secretary of the Interior. Appeals were filed from both judgments of
dismissal, but the parties agreed to dismiss North Fork’s appeal in
the case challenging the referendum, leaving only the concurrence
issue. The court held: After a referendum in which the voters
defeated the Legislature’s ratification under Gov. Code, § 12012.25,
and Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19, subd. (f), of a tribal-state compact for
gaming on newly acquired tribal land under the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq., the Governor did not have
implied power to concur in a federal determination allowing gaming
under 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(I)(A) because the state was not
exercising any express power from which an implied power could
be derived. The concurrence power was not inherent in the
Governor’s authority under Cal. Const., art. V, § 1, absent a stateapproved compact. The Governor’s authority regarding
communication and information under Gov. Code, § 12012, and
Cal. Const., art. V, § 4, did not extend to a concurrence. Because the
Legislature’s ratification was defeated, it provided no authority.
Reversed and remanded. The judgment was reversed. The
Governor’s concurrence is invalid under the facts alleged in this
case. Plaintiffs have stated a cause of action for a writ of mandate to
set the concurrence aside on the ground that it is unsupported by
legal authority.
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51.

Frank’s Landing Indian Community v. National Indian
Gaming Comm’n

No. C15-5828BHS, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37218 (W.D. Wash.
Mar. 15, 2017). Prior History: Frank’s Landing Indian Cmty. v.
Nat’l Indian Gaming Comm’n, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108581
(W.D. Wash., Aug. 15, 2016). This matter comes before the Court
on the motion for summary judgment of Plaintiff Frank’s Landing
Indian Community (the Community). Also, before the Court is the
cross-motion for summary judgment of the Defendants. The
“Community filed its complaint against the National Indian Gaming
Commission (the Commission) seeking injunctive and declaratory
relief that it qualifies as an Indian tribe under the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act of 1988, 25 U.S.C. 2701 et. seq. (IGRA). The
Commission and the Chairman moved to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. The Court granted the
Commission and the Chairman’s motion to dismiss, explaining that
“the Community’s dispute regarding qualification under the IGRA
as an ‘Indian tribe’ is with the Secretary and not with the
[Commission] or the Chairman.” The Community moved for
summary judgment. Defendants responded with their cross-motion
for summary judgment. The Community is a self-governing
dependent Indian community located along the Nisqually River near
Olympia, Washington. In 1987, Congress recognized the members
of the Community “as eligible for the special programs and services
provided by the United States to Indians because of their status as
Indians” and “as eligible to contract, and to receive grants, under the
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act for such
services.” Pub. L. No. 100-153, § 10, 101 Stat. 886, 889 (1987) (the
“1987 Frank’s Landing Act”). In 1994, Congress amended the law.
The Commission referred the matter to Interior’s Office of the
Solicitor, requesting an opinion on whether the Community is a tribe
within the meaning of the IGRA, who referred the matter to the
Assistant Secretary – Indian Affairs (“AS-IA”), Kevin Washburn.
On March 6, 2015, the AS-IA issued a memorandum to the
Commission Chairman conveying Interior’s conclusion that the
Community is not an Indian tribe within the meaning of the IGRA
because it is not a federally-recognized Indian tribe. Therefore, it is
hereby ORDERED that: 1. The Community’s motion for summary
judgment is DENIED; and 2. Defendants’ cross-motion for
summary judgment is GRANTED.
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52.

Massachusetts v. Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head
(Aquinnah)

No. 16-1137, 853 F.3d 618, 2017 WL 1315642 (1st Cir. Apr. 10,
2017). Commonwealth of Massachusetts brought action in a
Commonwealth court alleging that federally recognized Indian
tribe's efforts to commence commercial gaming operations on tribal
trust lands, pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA),
without having obtained a license from the Commonwealth violated
Indian Land Claims Settlement Act of 1987 (Massachusetts
Settlement Act). Following removal, town and community
association intervened and tribe filed counterclaim and third-party
claims against Commonwealth and Commonwealth officials.
Parties and intervenors moved for summary judgment. The District
Court, 144 F. Supp. 3d 152, entered summary judgment for
Commonwealth and intervenors. Tribe appealed. The appellate
court held that: (1) tribe made necessary threshold showing that it
exercised jurisdiction over the Settlement Lands at issue; (2) tribe
exercised sufficient governmental power to trigger application of
IGRA to Settlement Lands; and (3) IGRA effected partial repeal of
Settlement Act. Reversed.
53.

State of Kansas ex. Rel. Schmidt v. Zinke

No. 16-3015, 861 F.3d 1024, 2017 WL 2766292 (10th Cir. Jun. 27,
2017). State of Kansas and board of county commissioners brought
action against National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC),
arguing that legal opinion letter regarding eligibility of Indian lands
for gaming was arbitrary, capricious, and erroneous as a matter of
law. The District Court, 2017 WL 2766292, dismissed action. State
and county appealed. The appellate court held that: (1) NIGC Acting
General Counsel’s legal opinion letter was not a reviewable final
agency action under Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, and (2) NIGC
Acting General Counsel’s legal opinion letter did not constitute a
reviewable final agency action under Administrative Procedure Act.
Affirmed.
54.

Pueblo of Pojoaque v. New Mexico

No. 16-2228, 863 F.3d 1226, 2017 WL 3028501 (10th Cir. Jul. 18,
2017). Indian tribe brought action against state of New Mexico,
Governor of New Mexico, and members of New Mexico Gaming
111

Control Board, alleging that New Mexico failed to negotiate new
gaming compact in good faith under Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
(IGRA) and that state officials conspired to deprive tribe of federal
right to be free of state jurisdiction over activities that occurred on
tribal lands. The District Court, 2015 WL 10818855, granted Indian
tribe’s motion for temporary restraining order (TRO) and
preliminary injunction barring defendants from taking regulatory
enforcement actions against non-Indian, state-licensed gaming
manufacturer vendors doing business with Indian tribe’s gaming
enterprises. While defendants’ interlocutory appeal from order
granting injunction was pending, the District Court, 214 F.
Supp. 3d 1028, entered order staying preliminary injunction and
dismissing action, and then denied motion by tribe to vacate district
court’s order, 221 F. Supp. 3d 1289. Tribe appealed. The appellate
court held that: (1) de novo review applied to issue on appeal of
whether district court had jurisdiction to proceed to merits given
interlocutory appeal of preliminary injunction and, even if it did, of
whether it erred in concluding that IGRA did not preempt New
Mexico’s regulatory enforcement actions; (2) district court could
reach merits of action even though preliminary injunction was
pending on appeal; (3) traditional preemption analysis that looked
to whether federal law expressly or implicitly preempted state law
applied to New Mexico’s regulatory enforcement actions; (4) IGRA
did not expressly preempt New Mexico’s regulatory enforcement
actions against non-Indian, state-licensed gaming manufacturer
vendors doing business with Indian tribe’s gaming enterprises; and
(5) IGRA did not implicitly preempt New Mexico’s off-reservation
actions. Affirmed.
55.

Osceola Blackwood Ivory Gaming Group, LLC v. Picayune
Rancheria Of Chukchansi Indians, et al.

No. 1:17-cv-00394-DAD-BAM, 2017 WL 3190325, (E.D. Cal.
Jul. 27, 2017). This matter came before the court for hearing of
defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Civil Procedure
Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On March 16,
2017, plaintiff Osceola Blackwood Ivory Gaming Group, LLC
(OBIG), commenced this action against defendants Picayune
Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians (Chukansi Tribe) and Chukchansi
Economic Development Authority (CEDA) alleging breach of
contract and negligent interference with prospective economic
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advantage. Plaintiff seeks an award of compensatory damages,
restitutionary damages, punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees and
costs. In the complaint, plaintiff alleges the following. In October
2014, the Casino closed. Defendants subsequently began working to
reopen the facility. On July 8, 2015, defendants contracted with
plaintiff for “business consulting advice and services” related to the
reopening of its casino (the Consulting Contract). The Consulting
Contract provided that the agreement would take effect upon
execution and would be effective for a term of twenty-four months
or until the “facility becomes managed pursuant to a Management
Agreement approved by the National Indian Gaming Commission”
(NIGC). The contract also provided that defendants “expressly,
unequivocally and irrevocably waive their sovereign immunity” for
“any legal proceeding with respect to the Consulting Agreement, or
any of the transactions contemplated in the Consulting Agreement.”
The Tribal Council for the Chukchansi Tribe approved the
agreement by adopting Resolution No. 2015-31. On the same day
the parties entered into the Consulting Contract, the parties also
orally agreed to enter into a Management Agreement, and
defendants promised to promptly submit the Management
Agreement to the NIGC for approval. On July 29, 2015, defendants
entered into the Management Agreement with plaintiff, which
agreement the Chukchansi Tribal Council approved by adopting
Resolution No. 2015-46. The contract stated that it had a term of
five years and would take effect five days after the following
conditions were met: (i) the Chairman of the NIGC granted written
approval of the contract; (ii) the Chukchansi Tribe and NIGC
concluded background investigations of plaintiff; and (iii) plaintiff
received all applicable licenses and permits for the facility. From
July to December 2015, plaintiff provided management and
consulting services to defendants. The Casino reopened on
December 31, 2015. In April 2016, the parties agreed to amend the
Management Agreement to adjust plaintiff’s compensation rate and
to extend the term of the agreement from five to seven years.
Defendants also agreed to submit a revised version of the agreement
to the NIGC for approval. To date, defendants have failed to submit
either the original Management Agreement or the proposed
amended agreement to the NIGC. As a result of defendants’ failure
to submit either the agreement or the revised agreement to the NIGC
for approval, plaintiff has experienced financial loss. On May 10,
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2017, defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss plaintiff’s
complaint in its entirety based on this court’s lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. The court concludes that the addressing of plaintiff’s
claims does not require resolution of a substantial question of federal
law, and that the court therefore lacks original jurisdiction over any
claims asserted in plaintiff’s complaint. For the reasons stated above
Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted and this action is
dismissed.
H.
56.

Jurisdiction, Federal
Alvarez v. Lopez

No. 12-15788, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16056 (9th Cir. Aug. 30,
2016). Member of Indian tribe filed petition for writ of habeas
corpus alleging that his convictions and sentences by tribal court
violated Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA). The U.S. District Court for
the District of Arizona, 2012 WL 1038746, denied petition, and
petitioner appealed. After affirmance, 773 F.3d 1011, petition for
panel rehearing was granted. The appellate court held that: (1) tribe
deliberately waived any non-exhaustion defense, and (2) tribe
violated petitioner’s right to jury trial under Indian Civil Rights Act
(ICRA). The court concluded that the inmate’s interests in
understanding the full contours of his rights under 25 U.S.C.S.
§ 1302, part of the Indian Civil Rights Act, outweighed any interests
of the community. The inmate’s right to “fair treatment” included
the right to know that he would forfeit his right to a jury unless he
affirmatively requested one. Judgment reversed, and case remanded.
57.

Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Great Plains
Lending, LLC

No. 14-55900, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 1028 (9th Cir. Jan. 20, 2017).
The panel affirmed the district court’s decision compelling Tribal
Lending Entities to comply with civil investigative demands issued
by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. The Tribal entities
are for-profit lending companies created by the Chippewa Cree,
Tunica Biloxi and Otoe Missouria Tribes (Tribes). The Bureau
initiated an investigation into the Tribal Lending Entities to
determine whether small-dollar lenders violated federal consumer
financial laws. The Tribes directed the Tribal Lending Entities not
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to respond to the investigative demands. The panel held that the
Consumer Financial Protection Act was a law of general
applicability, and it applied to tribal businesses, like the Tribal
Lending Entities involved in this appeal. The panel further held that
Congress did not expressly exclude Tribes from the Bureau’s
enforcement authority. The panel also held that none of the three
exceptions in Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farms, 751 F.2d
1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 1985), to the enforcement of generally
applicable laws against Indian tribes applied to this case. The panel
concluded that the district court properly held that the Bureau did
not plainly lack jurisdiction to issue investigative demands to the
tribal corporate entities under the Act. Order affirmed.
58.

Jones v. United States

No. 15-8629, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 1479 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 27, 2017).
HOLDINGS: (1) Where decedent was shot during a police pursuit
that ended on a Native American reservation, the trial court erred by
dismissing the estate’s claim for damages against the United States
because the court improperly limited the scope of claims cognizable
under the bad men provision of the Treaty with the Ute, 15 Stat. 619
(1868); (2) The estate claimed that officers concocted a false story
that decedent shot himself, and failed to take custody of decedent’s
body and to secure it against desecration and spoliation of evidence;
(3) The trial court erred in dismissing all the off-reservation actions
as not cognizable; (4) Some of the alleged wrongs were a
continuation of the conspiracy to cover-up the on-reservation
killing; (5) The trial court erred in issue precluding claims, as the
culpability of the federal officers for spoliation had never been
decided. Vacated and remanded.
59.

Wyoming v. United States EPA

Nos. 14-9512 and 14-9514, 849 F.3d 861, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS
3120 (10th Cir. Feb. 22, 2017). This case requires us to determine
whether Congress diminished the boundaries of the Wind River
Reservation in Wyoming in 1905. The Eastern Shoshone and
Northern Arapaho Tribes jointly inhabit the Wind River
Reservation. The State of Wyoming and the Wyoming Farm Bureau
Federation challenge a decision by the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) granting the Tribes’ application for joint authority to
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administer certain non-regulatory programs under the Clean Air Act
(CAA) on the Reservation. As part of their application for
administrative authority, the Tribes were required to show they
possess jurisdiction over the relevant land. In their application, the
Tribes described the boundaries of the Wind River Reservation and
asserted that most of the land within the original 1868 boundaries
fell within their jurisdiction. Wyoming and others submitted
comments to the EPA arguing the Reservation had been diminished
in 1905 by act of Congress, and that some land described in the
application was no longer within tribal jurisdiction. After review,
the EPA determined the Reservation had not been diminished in
1905 and the Tribes retained jurisdiction over the land at issue.
Because the EPA decided the Tribes otherwise satisfied Clean Air
Act program requirements, it granted their application. Wyoming
and the Farm Bureau appealed the EPA’s Reservation boundary
determination. Regionally applicable final actions of the EPA are
directly appealable to this court. Exercising jurisdiction under 42
U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1), we grant the petition for review, vacate the
EPA’s boundary determination, and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. We find by its 1905 legislation,
Congress evinced a clear intent to diminish the Reservation.
60. Tavares v. Whitehouse
No. 14-15814, 2017 WL 971799, 851 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. Mar. 14,
2017). Petitioners, who were members of Indian tribe and excluded
from tribal lands and facilities for allegedly libeling and slandering
tribe, sought writ of habeas corpus under Indian Civil Rights Act
(ICRA). The District Court, 2014 WL 1155798, dismissed petition.
Petitioners appealed. The Appellate Court held that: (1) any disputes
about per capita payments from an Indian tribe to a tribal member
must be brought in a tribal forum, not through federal habeas
proceedings; (2) temporary exclusion from Indian tribal land is not
tantamount to a “detention,” for purpose of detention requirement of
habeas corpus provision of ICRA; and (3) exclusion of petitioners
was not a “detention” within meaning of habeas provision of ICRA,
as required for district court jurisdiction. Affirmed.
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61.

United States v. Jackson

No. 15-1789, 2017 WL 1228564 , 853 F.3d 436 (8th Cir. Apr. 4,
2017). After his motion to dismiss the indictment was denied,
defendant, an Indian, entered a conditional plea of guilty in the
District Court, 2011 WL 7395040, to assault with a dangerous
weapon and discharging a firearm during commission of crime of
violence. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals, 697 F.3d 670,
vacated and remanded. On remand, the District Court entered final
judgment sentencing defendant to 136 months in prison. Defendant
appealed. The Court of Appeals held that evidence supported district
court's determination that reservation on which alleged assault
occurred was not diminished by 1905 Act. Affirmed.
62.

Rabang v. Kelly

No. C17-0088-JCC, 2017 WL 1496415 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 26,
2017). This case arises out of the disenrollment of hundreds of
Nooksack tribal members, and the subsequent Department of the
Interior (DOI) and Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) decisions, also at
issue in a related case before this Court. Plaintiffs in this matter are
“purportedly disenrolled” members of the Nooksack Indian Tribe.
Defendants Kelly, George, Smith, Solomon, Johnson, and Canete
are members of the Nooksack Indian Tribal Council that Plaintiffs
classify as the “holdover council” as of March 24, 2016. Defendants
Dodge, King George, Romero, Edwards, and Armstrong are other
actors within Nooksack tribal leadership and agencies. Plaintiffs
allege “Defendants' scheme to defraud Plaintiffs and the federal
government began with fraudulently preventing elections for over
half of the eight” Nooksack Indian Tribal Council seats. The
Nooksack Indian Tribal Council carries out tribal governance and
consists of eight positions. Five members constitute a quorum for
the Council. On October 17, 2016, Lawrence S. Roberts, DOI's
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs, issued a
decision to the holdover council Defendants stating: “In rare
situations where tribal council does not maintain a quorum to take
action pursuant to the Tribe's Constitution, the Department of the
Interior does not recognize actions taken by the Tribe. This is one of
those exceedingly rare situations. Accordingly, I am writing to
inform you and the remaining Council members that the [DOI] will
only recognize those actions taken by the [Nooksack Indian Tribal]
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Council prior to March 24, 2016, when a quorum existed, and will
not recognize any other actions taken since that time.” However,
also on October 17, 2016, the holdover council Defendants mailed
Plaintiffs and over 275 other Tribal members a “Notice of
Involuntary Disenrollment.” On November 9, 2016, the holdover
council Defendants mailed the disenrolled members a “Legal Notice
of Disenrollment” and stated that a disenrollment “meeting date”
had been set via teleconference for November 16, 17, or 18, 2016.
On November 14, 2016, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
Roberts issued a second decision to the holdover council Defendants
reiterating “until a Council is seated through an election consistent
with tribal law . . . , we will not recognize any “referendum election”
including the purported results posted on the Tribe's Facebook page
on November 4, 2016, claiming to disenroll current tribal citizens. .
. .” On February 2, 2017, Plaintiffs filed their amended complaint,
alleging violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO). Defendants Kelly, George, Smith,
Solomon, Johnson, Canete, King George, Romero, Edwards, and
Armstrong filed this motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. For the foregoing reasons,
Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED
in part. The Court DISMISSES the § 1962(c) money laundering
claim and all § 1962(c) claims against Defendant Armstrong.
However, these claims are dismissed without prejudice because
dismissal with prejudice is “improper unless it is clear, upon de novo
review, that the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.”
Krainski v. Nev. ex rel. Bd. of Regents of Nev. Sys. of Higher Educ.,
616 F.3d 963, 972 (9th Cir. 2010).
63.

Denise Lightning Fire v. United States

No. 3 15-CV-03015-RAL, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72316 (D.S.D.
May 9, 2017). Plaintiffs Denise Lightning Fire and Wakiyan Peta
are the legal guardians of SC, a minor child. The Plaintiffs sued the
United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U S C
§§ 1346(b), 2671-2680, alleging that the negligence of a federal
employee caused SC to be burned by hot oil while cooking frybread
at the Cheyenne-Eagle Butte School. The United States filed a
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12(h)(3), or in
the alternative, a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56(c) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. SC was a student attending the
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Cheyenne-Eagle Butte School on the Cheyenne River Indian
Reservation and participating in her home economics class, learning
how to make stuffed frybread. As SC was putting her piece of
frybread into the hot oil, water on the fork contacted the hot oil and
caused the oil to spatter onto her hand, wrist, neck and face. After
SC screamed in pain, her teacher, Peggy Henson, began running
cold water over the burns and notified the school office. SC was
taken to the Eagle Butte Indian Health Services facility for
treatment. Plaintiffs presented an administrative claim for SC’s
injuries, pain and suffering, and emotional distress to the Bureau of
Indian Affairs (BIA) and to the Bureau of Indian Education (BIE).
Plaintiffs’ administrative claim was denied. In September 2015,
Plaintiffs filed this claim under the FTCA, requesting damages for
SC’s physical pain, loss of enjoyment of life, mental and emotional
suffering, past and future medical expenses, prejudgment interests,
costs and attorney’s fees. The United States answered the
Complaint, denying that SC’s teacher, Henson, was a federal
employee. The United States then filed a motion to dismiss or
alternatively a motion for summary judgment. The motion to
dismiss argued that Henson was not a federal employee for purposes
of the FTCA, so this Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction
over the Plaintiffs’ complaint. The motion for summary judgment
argued in the alternative that if this Court found Henson to be a
federal employee, her conduct was protected under the discretionary
function exception to the FTCA. The court granted Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss.
64. United States v. Antonio
No. CR 16-1106 JB, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85436 (D.N.M. June 5,
2017). This matter comes before the Court on the Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction,
filed April 10, 2017 (Motion). The primary issue is whether the
Court has jurisdiction over this matter under the Indian Pueblo Land
Act Amendments of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-133, 119 Stat. 2573
(Dec. 20, 2005), codified at 25 U.S.C. § 331 Note, because the
automobile collision giving rise to Plaintiff United States of
America’s criminal prosecution against Defendant Jeffrey Antonio,
which occurred on private land, nonetheless occurred within the
exterior boundaries of the 1748 Spanish land grant to the Sandia
Pueblo, which Congress confirmed in the Act of December 22,
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1858, 11 Stat. 374, 374 (1859). The Court concludes: (i) the
automobile collision giving rise to this criminal cause of action
occurred within the exterior boundaries of the 1748 Spanish land
grant; and, consequently, (ii) under 25 U.S.C. § 33m the Court has
jurisdiction over this matter. Accordingly, the Court denies
Antonio’s Motion.
65.

In re Roberts Litigation

No. 15-35404, 693 Fed. Appx. 630, 2017 WL 2928130 (9th Cir.
Jul. 10, 2017). Sherri Roberts, a non-Indian, was arrested twice
pursuant to bench warrants issued by the Northern Cheyenne Tribal
Court. She brought a Bivens action against three Bureau of Indian
Affairs law enforcement officers (BIA Officers), alleging that both
arrests violated her Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. She also
brought a Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) claim against the United
States for the second arrest, alleging false arrest, false imprisonment,
and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The district court
granted summary judgment against Roberts on all claims. The
district court correctly granted summary judgment against Roberts
on the Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims on the ground that the
BIA Officers had qualified immunity. Because the BIA Officers did
not violate clearly established constitutional law when they arrested
Roberts pursuant to a facially valid warrant issued by the tribal
court, they are entitled to qualified immunity. The officers’ good
faith reliance on the facially valid warrant was not unreasonable.
The district court correctly granted summary judgment against
Roberts on the FTCA claims alleging false arrest, false
imprisonment, and negligent infliction of emotional distress because
Roberts’s second arrest was made pursuant to facially valid warrant.
The bench warrant was issued pursuant to the tribal judge’s correct
determination that Roberts failed to appear at a status conference,
which established probable cause to arrest her. Thus, the lawful
arrest is a “complete defense” to Roberts’s false arrest or
imprisonment claims. The BIA Officer did not engage in a
“negligent act or omission.” Affirmed.
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66.

United States ex rel. Cain v. Salish Kootenai
College, Inc.

No. 15-35001, 2017 WL 2924090 (9th Cir. Jul. 10, 2017). Former
employees filed qui tam action under False Claims Act (FCA)
alleging that college located on Indian reservation, college
foundation, and college’s board members knowingly provided false
progress reports on students in order to keep grant monies coming
from Department of Health and Human Services ad Indian Health
Service. The United States District Court for the District of
Montana, No. 9:12-cv-00181, dismissed complaint, and employees
appealed. The appellate court held that: (1) Indian tribe was not
“person” subject to suit under FCA, and (2) issue of whether college
was arm of tribe was matter to be addressed in first instance by
district court following jurisdictional discovery. Reversed and
remanded.
67.

Dennis Ruchert v. John Pete Williamson; Nez Perce Tribal
Police; and Nez Perce Tribe

No. 3:16-cv-00413-BLW, 2017 WL 3120267 (D. Idaho Jul. 21,
2017). Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
for Lack of Jurisdiction. This negligence action arises from a motor
vehicle collision on March 27, 2014, involving Plaintiffs Dennis
Ruchert and Cheryl Ruchert and Defendant John Pete Williamson,
an employee of the Nez Perce Tribal Police Department. On March
8, 2016, Plaintiffs filed suit in state court, alleging that the collision
was caused by Williamson’s negligence and seeking damages for
personal injuries and property damage. Defendants had the action
removed to this Court on September 14, 2016. Soon thereafter, the
United States filed the present Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. The United States Attorney for the District of
Idaho, on behalf of the Attorney General, filed a certification
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1) stating that Williamson was
acting within the scope of his employment with the Nez Perce Tribal
Police Department at the time of the accident. The certification also
attests that Defendants Williamson, Nez Perce Tribal Police, and
Nez Perce Tribe were performing authorized functions under the
tribe’s funding contract with the Bureau of Indian Affairs pursuant
to the Indian Self Determination and Education Assistance Act
(ISDEAA). Accordingly, the United States argues that it must be
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substituted as the sole named defendant in this action and that
Plaintiffs’ exclusive remedy lies under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA). Because Plaintiffs failed to file an administrative tort claim
with Williamson’s employing agency prior to filing suit, as required
by the FTCA, the United States argues that this court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction to hear their claims. The Court granted
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and the matter was dismissed
without prejudice.
68. Murphy v. Royal
Nos. 07-7068 & 15-7041, 866 F.3d 1164, 2017 WL 3389877 (10th
Cir. Aug. 8, 2017), Opinion Amended and Superseded on Denial of
Rehearing en banc by Murphy v. Royal, 875 F.3d 896 (10th Cir.
2017). After Oklahoma state prisoner’s conviction for first-degree
murder and death sentence were affirmed on appeal, 47 P.3d 876,
he filed petition for writ of habeas corpus. The District Court for the
Eastern District of Oklahoma, 497 F. Supp. 2d 1257, denied
prisoner’s petition. Prisoner appealed. The appellate court held that:
(1) prisoner’s claim was governed by clearly established federal
law; (2) Oklahoma state appellate court rendered merits decision on
prisoner’s claim that state court lacked jurisdiction because crime
occurred on Indian land; (3) Oklahoma state appellate court’s
decision was contrary to clearly established federal law; and (4)
Congress did not disestablish Indian reservation, and thus Oklahoma
state court lacked jurisdiction to prosecute defendant for murder that
occurred on reservation. Reversed and remanded.
69.

United States v. Bearcomesout

No. 16-30276, 2017 WL 3530904 (9th Cir. Aug. 17, 2017). Tawnya
Bearcomesout appeals from the district court’s denial of her motion
to dismiss the indictment and challenges her guilty-plea conviction
for involuntary manslaughter, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153(a)
and 1112(a). Bearcomesout argues that the Double Jeopardy Clause
barred her successive homicide prosecutions by the Northern
Cheyenne Tribe and the United States government because the two
entities are not separate sovereigns. This argument is foreclosed. See
Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1870-72 (2016)
(successive prosecutions for the same offense are not barred by the
Double Jeopardy Clause if brought by separate sovereigns, and
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Indian Tribes “count as separate sovereigns under the Double
Jeopardy Clause”). Furthermore, Bearcomesout has not shown
impermissible collusion between the United States government and
the Northern Cheyenne Tribe such that an exception applies under
Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959). See United States v. Lucas,
841 F.3d 796, 803 (9th Cir. 2016) (impermissible collusion occurs
where “the prosecutors of one sovereign so thoroughly dominate or
manipulate the prosecutorial machinery of the other sovereign that
the latter retains little or no volition in its own proceedings” (internal
quotations omitted)). AFFIRMED.
I.

Religious Freedom

70. Begnoche v. D.L. Derose
No. 16-3723, 676 Fed. Appx. 117, 2017 WL 378741 (3rd Cir.
Jan. 12, 2017). State prisoner brought § 1983 action against various
prison officials, alleging that officials prevented him from
exercising his Native American religious beliefs, that prisoners of
non-Christian faiths were provided disparate treatment, that prison
staff tampered with his legal correspondence, and that prison
grievance system was inadequate. The District Court of the Middle
District of Pennsylvania, 2016 WL 4611545, granted in part
officials’ motion to dismiss, granted in part prisoner’s motion for
reconsideration, and granted officials’ motions for summary
judgment. Prisoner appealed. The Court of Appeals held that:
(1) officials did not deprive prisoner of his First Amendment right
to practice his religion, and (2) officials did not interfere with
prisoner’s exercise of his Native American religious beliefs or
violate the Establishment Clause. Affirmed.
J.
71.

Sovereign Immunity

Meyers v. Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wis.

No. 15-3127, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16515 (7th Cir. Sep. 8, 2016).
When Congress enacted the Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction
Act (FACTA) in 2003, it included within the Act a provision to
reduce the amount of potentially misappropriatable information
produced in credit and debit card receipts. The Act prohibits
merchants from printing on the receipt the credit card expiration date
and more than the last five digits of the credit or debit card number.
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The plaintiff in this case, Jeremy Meyers, used his credit card to
make purchases at two stores owned by the defendant, the Oneida
Tribe of Indians of Wisconsin, and received an electronicallyprinted receipt at each store that included more than the last five
digits of his credit card as well as the card’s expiration date. Meyers
brought a putative class action in the Eastern District of Wisconsin
for violations of FACTA, but the district court determined that the
defendant, an Indian Tribe, was immune from suit under the Act.
Meyers appealed and the appellate court affirmed, holding:
(1) Since the Indian Tribe had sovereign immunity, plaintiff could
not obtain relief from the Tribe through his suit; (2) Congress simply
had not unequivocally abrogated the sovereign immunity of Indian
Tribes under the FACTA provision at issue in the case; (3) Contrary
to plaintiff’s assertion, the district court did not dismiss his claim
because it concluded that Indian Tribes were not governments; (4) It
dismissed his claim because it could not find a clear, unequivocal
statement in FACTA that Congress meant to abrogate the sovereign
immunity of Indian Tribes; (5) The question here was not whether
the Tribe was subject to the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), it
was whether plaintiff could sue the Tribe for violating the FCRA.
Dismissal affirmed.
72.

Buchwald Capital Advisors, LLC v. Papas (In re Greektown
Holdings, LLC)

Nos. 08-53104, 10-05712, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 3605 (U.S. Bankr.
E.D. Mich. Sep. 29, 2016). The Litigation Trustee (Plaintiff) by this
adversary proceeding essentially seeks to avoid aspects of a
restructuring and financing transaction whereby Greektown
Holdings, LLC, a Debtor, directly or indirectly transferred money to
multiple parties, including the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa
Indians and its political subdivision Kewadin Casinos Gaming
Authority (together, the Tribe Defendants). Plaintiff brought this
fraudulent transfer action under 11 U.S.C. §§ 544 and 550,
incorporating Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 566.34 and 566.35. This
Opinion follows the District Court’s Opinion, In re Greektown
Holdings, LLC, 532 B.R. 680 (E.D. Mich. 2015) reversing this
Court’s Opinion at 516 B.R. 462 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014). This
Court had concluded that 11 U.S.C. § 106(a) abrogated the Tribe
Defendants’ sovereign immunity, but the District Court (a) reversed
on appeal finding that the statute does not thereby waive tribal
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sovereign immunity; and (b) remanded the case for further
proceedings relative to whether or not the Tribe Defendants had
waived sovereign immunity. This Opinion deals with what
constitutes a “clear waiver by the tribe.” The Tribe Defendants’
initial argument is that the indicated clear waiver may only be
accomplished by the required passage of duly adopted resolutions
by the boards governing each of the Tribe Defendants. It is
undisputed that no such resolutions were ever adopted. Further, it is
also an undisputed fact that the Tribe Defendants never entered into
any contract containing provisions purporting to waive sovereign
immunity. Plaintiff responds arguing that, notwithstanding the lack
of enacted resolutions, the Tribe Defendants can and should be seen
as having waived their sovereign immunity by virtue of their
conduct in, or incident to, these bankruptcy and related proceedings,
as well as the involved underlying business transactions.
Specifically that alleged conduct involves the Tribe Defendants
having pervasive involvement in the events leading up to and after
the Debtors’ bankruptcy filings, including the Tribe Defendants
doing the following: (a) intermingling the functions of the various
tribal and non-tribal parties in carrying out the Debtors’ business;
(b) utilizing the Debtors as their agents and causing the Debtors to
make the alleged fraudulent transfers; (c) directing the Debtors to
initiate their bankruptcy petitions; (d) dominating and controlling
the Debtors, directing their post-petition litigation strategy, and
sharing the same professionals; and (e) filing in the bankruptcy
cases multiple proofs of claim, objections to plan confirmation, and
an application for allowance of administrative expense claim. Based
on these facts and events, Plaintiff argues that (1) the Tribe
Defendants should be considered as legally standing in the shoes of
the Debtors as their equivalents via theories of alter ego, piercing
the corporate veil, and/or agency; and (2) by reason of such, the
Tribe Defendants thusly should be seen as having voluntarily
waived their sovereign immunity. The questions presented thus are:
(a) is appropriate and specific governing board action the only way
the Tribe Defendants can waive their sovereign immunity; and (b) if
not, and if waiver can be accomplished by conduct, was there such
a waiver in the circumstances of this case? The court held that:
(1) An Indian tribe did not waive tribal sovereign immunity in a
bankruptcy trustee’s action alleging that the tribe was the recipient
of fraudulent transfers from bankruptcy debtors, since the tribe’s
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assertion of claims in the bankruptcy cases did not constitute the
required express, unequivocal, unmistakable, and unambiguous
waiver of immunity; and (2) Even if the trustee could prove that the
tribe effectively filed the bankruptcy petitions on behalf of the
debtors under theories of alter ego, piercing the corporate veil,
and/or agency, such asserted waiver of tribal sovereign immunity by
implication was legally insufficient to meet the high standard of an
express waiver of immunity. Motion to dismiss granted.
73.

Crawford v. Couture

No. DA 16-0282, 2016 Mont. LEXIS 976, 2016 MT 291 (Mont.
Nov. 15, 2016). Robert Crawford appeals from an April 20, 2016,
District Court order granting a motion to dismiss Crawford’s claims
against Flathead Tribal Police Officer Casey Couture (Couture), the
Flathead Tribal Police Department, and the Confederated Salish
Kootenai Tribal Government. The issue on appeal was whether the
District Court erred when it dismissed Crawford’s claims for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. On March 13, 2012, Crawford was
pulled over by Couture on the Flathead Reservation. Couture
identified each person in the vehicle, arrested one, letting Crawford
and the others leave. Couture was then in contact with Crawford’s
parole officer, who informed Couture that Crawford was in violation
of his parole because he did not have permission to be traveling in
that area. On March 17, 2012, Lake County Deputy Sheriff Levi
Read (Read) arrested Crawford on the Flathead Reservation upon a
warrant issued by Butte-Silver Bow County Probation for parole
violations. The State charged Crawford with criminal possession of
dangerous drugs. A jury found him guilty. Crawford appealed his
conviction and we affirmed in State v. Robert Lee Crawford, 2016
MT 96, 383 Mont. 229, 371 P.3d 381. During his appeal, Crawford
filed the instant complaint in state court seeking recovery from the
named defendants. Crawford alleged numerous claims including
libel, slander, false imprisonment, and injuries involving property
due to inappropriate conduct by Couture. The Tribes, on behalf of
the Tribes, Couture, and the Police Department filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint or in the alternative for summary judgment.
The District Court granted the Tribes’ motion to dismiss based on
lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the sovereign immunity of the
Tribe. Crawford appealed. The appellate court found that the (1)
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district court properly dismissed Crawford’s claims based on lack of
subject matter jurisdiction and sovereign immunity. Affirmed.
74.

Clema v. Colombe

No. 16-2004, 676 Fed. Appx. 801, 2017 WL 360486 (10th Cir.
Jan. 25, 2017). Suspect brought § 1983 action against tribal police
officer and county, alleging that his arrest was unlawful. The United
States District Court for the District of New Mexico granted
summary judgment for defendants. Suspect appealed. The Court of
Appeals held that: (1) officer was public employee entitled to
immunity under New Mexico Tort Claims Act (NMTCA);
(2) officer had probable cause to arrest suspect; and (3) an arrest
supported by probable cause cannot be the basis for a claim of false
imprisonment or malicious prosecution. Affirmed.
75.

Lundgren v. Upper Skagit Indian Tribe

No. 91622-5, 2017 Wash. LEXIS 219 (Wash. Feb. 16, 2017).
Sharline and Ray Lundgren and the Upper Skagit Indian Tribe own
adjacent properties in Skagit County, Washington. A barbed wire
fence runs along the southern portion of the Tribe’s land. The fence
spans the width of the Tribe’s lot, with a gate approximately halfway
along the fence line. The land between the fence and the southern
boundary of the Tribe’s lot is the land at issue in this case. The
Lundgrens bought the 10 acres of land immediately south of the
disputed property in 1981. The property had been in their extended
family since 1947. The Lundgrens established that the fence on the
disputed property has been in the same location since at least 1947,
and that for as long as their property has been in the family, they
have treated the fence as the boundary line. Since 1947, the
Lundgren family exclusively has harvested timber, cleared brush,
kept the fence clear of fallen trees, and treated the disputed property
on the southern side of the fence as their own. In September 2014,
the Tribe notified the Lundgrens in a letter that the fence did not
represent the boundary and that they were asserting ownership rights
to the entire property deeded to them in 2013. The Lundgrens asked
the court to quiet title in the disputed property to them and sought
injunctive relief. The Lundgrens moved for summary judgment,
arguing they acquired title to the disputed property by adverse
possession or by mutual recognition and acquiescence long before
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the Tribe bought the land. The Tribe moved to dismiss under CR
12(b)(1) for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the Tribe’s
sovereign immunity and under CR 12(b)(7), which requires joinder
of a necessary and indispensable party under CR 19. HOLDINGS:
(1) Action to quiet title to property on a theory of adverse possession
was not barred by the court’s inability to assert personal jurisdiction
over the Indian tribe due to sovereign immunity because the action
was a proceeding in rem and, following a merit-based determination
under Wash. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 19, it could not be said that the Indian
tribe had an interest that would be adversely affected in the
litigation; (2) When no interest is found to exist, especially in an in
rem proceeding, nonjoinder presents no jurisdictional barriers; (3)
Because the Indian tribe did not have an interest in the disputed
property, the tribe’s sovereign immunity was no barrier to the in rem
proceeding. The trial court’s denial of the Indian tribe’s motion to
dismiss and its grant of summary judgment to the plaintiffs were
affirmed by the reviewing court.
76.

Pacheco v. Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Cmty.

No. CV-16-01947-PHX-GMS, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23352 (D.
Ariz. Feb. 16, 2017). Pending before the Court is Defendant Salt
River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community’s Motion to Dismiss.
Robert Pacheco is a former police officer for Salt River PimaMaricopa Indian Community. The Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian
Community (the Community) is a sovereign Native American
Indian Tribe. In 2014, Mr. Pacheco suffered from a chronic medical
condition that required him to be absent from work for an extended
period of time. He alleges that he initially filed for and received
forms for approved leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA), and that the Community improperly revoked his leave and
discharged him. Soon after the Complaint was filed, the Community
moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1). Both parties concede that the
Community is a federally recognized Native American Indian Tribe,
and it is therefore entitled to the presumption of tribal sovereign
immunity. However, Plaintiff asserts that tribal sovereign immunity
should not apply in this case because it was effectively waived by
the Community’s alleged adoption of FMLA standards for its
continuous leave policy. Even assuming that the Community has
adopted the FMLA standards, this argument fails. Without any
explicit reference to “court enforcement, suing or being sued, or any
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other phrase clearly contemplating suits against” the tribe, the tribe’s
adoption of FMLA policies do “not amount to an unequivocal
waiver” of sovereign immunity. Therefore, the Community did not
waive its tribal sovereign immunity by adopting FMLA policies and
standards. IT IS THERFORE ORDERED that the Community’s
Motion to Dismiss is granted.
77.

Bruguier v. Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior
Chippewa Indians

Nos. 16-cv-604-jdp, 16-cv-605-jdp, 2017 WL 684230 (W.D. Wis.
Feb. 21. 2017). Plaintiffs Jeaninne Bruguier and Joni Theobald
asserted claims under Title VII and state law, alleging that
defendants wrongfully terminated their employment and otherwise
violated their rights because of plaintiffs’ political activities.
Defendants Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa
Indians, L.D.F. Business Development Corporation, and Henry St.
Germaine jointly moved to dismiss these actions on several
threshold issues. The court will dismiss all Title VII claims under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for plaintiffs’ failure to
state a claim. Tribal sovereign immunity precludes their claims, and
an Indian tribe is not an employer under Title VII. The court will
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law
claims and dismiss both cases. IT IS ORDERED that:
(1) Defendants Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa
Indians, Henry St. Germaine, and L.D.F. Business Development
Corporation’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED; (2) These cases are
DISMISSED.
78.

Harper v. White Earth Human Resource

No. 16–1797 (JRT/LIB), 2017 WL 701354 (D. Minn. Feb. 22,
2017). MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE
JUDGE. Plaintiff Leigh Harper brings this action pro se against
Defendants White Earth Human Resource, White Earth Boys and
Girls Club, and White Earth Education Department (collectively
Defendants). Harper alleges that she worked at the White Earth
Boys and Girls Club and that she was fired “to prevent her
grievances and complaints from being acted on.” Harper alleges
various statutory and constitutional claims, including violations of
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the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the
Rehabilitation Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, Minn. Stat.
§ 181.961, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, the Indian Civil Rights Act, and the Revised
Constitution of the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe. On June 17, 2016,
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. An agency is entitled to sovereign immunity if it
“served as an arm of the sovereign tribes, acting as more than a mere
business.” Hagen, 205 F.3d at 1043. Sovereign immunity covers
the actions of tribal governments and tribal agencies unless it has
been unequivocally waived or abrogated by Congress. The
supporting documents that Harper submitted indicate that White
Earth Tribe was her employer. Despite these concessions, Harper
argues that because the alleged actions were not carried out by
members of the White Earth government acting within the scope of
their authority, the actions are not protected by sovereign immunity.
However, contrary to Harper’s assertion, tribes or tribal officials
need not explicitly invoke sovereign immunity; instead, courts
assume that the tribe is immune unless Congress has expressly
abrogated that protection, or the tribe has expressly waived its
immunity. Thus, the tribal entities sued here are entitled to sovereign
immunity, and Harper’s lawsuit is barred absent abrogation or
waiver. Harper’s claims are DISMISSED with prejudice.
79.

In re Money Center of America, Inc.

Case No. 14–10603 Jointly Administered, Adv. Proc. Case No. 14–
50437, Adv. Proc. Case No. 16–50410, 2017 WL 775780,
565 B.R. 87 (D. Del. Feb. 28, 2017). Chapter 11 trustee brought
adversary proceeding to recover allegedly preferential transfers
made to tribal entity the operated casino for benefit of Indian tribe.
In separate proceeding, another tribal entity brought adversary
proceeding for determination that sums owed to it under its financial
services agreement with debtor were not included in property of the
estate, and trustee counterclaimed for recovery of prepetition
preferential transfers. Tribal entities moved to dismiss trustee’s
complaint or counterclaims based on their alleged tribal sovereign
immunity. The Bankruptcy Court held that: (1) entities which
operated casinos for benefit of Indian tribes had sufficiently close
relationship to tribes to share in tribes’ sovereign immunity;
(2) Congress did not unequivocally express its intent to abrogate
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sovereign immunity of Indian tribes, such that Indian tribes, or
closely-affiliated entities that operated casinos on tribes’ behalf,
could not be object of preference avoidance proceedings absent a
waiver of their tribal sovereign immunity; (3) waiver issue could not
be determined on motion to dismiss; (4) bankruptcy statute that
barred creditor that was recipient of avoidable transfer from
recovering on its claim until transfer was repaid was not operative
as to tribal entity; and (5) tribes and tribal entities were not
“governmental units,” under statute providing that “governmental
unit” that had filed a proof of claim was deemed to have waived its
sovereign immunity with respect to a claim against that
governmental unit which was property of the estate, and which arose
out of the same transaction or occurrence. Motion granted in part
and denied in part.
80.

Federated Indians of Graton Rancheria v. Kenwood
Investments No. 2, LLC

A147281, 2017 WL 895800 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 7. 2017). Federated
Indians of Graton Rancheria (the Tribe) entered into an agreement
with Kenwood Investments No. 2, LLC (Kenwood), whereby
Kenwood would provide consulting services concerning the
development of a casino on a particular site. In connection with this
agreement, the Tribe approved a resolution waiving its sovereign
immunity from suit by Kenwood. The parties subsequently amended
the agreement to allow for the development of another site.
Litigation ensued when the Tribe allegedly failed to make required
payments to Kenwood, and the Tribe claimed its waiver of
sovereign immunity did not apply because of the amendment to the
contract. The trial court disagreed and entered judgment for
Kenwood and also awarded Kenwood attorney fees pursuant to an
indemnity clause in the agreement. We affirm the trial court’s
findings regarding sovereign immunity but reverse the award of
attorney fees.
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81.

Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Runyon

No. 3:17–cv–00038-AA, 2017 WL 923915, 320 F.R.D. 245 (D.
Ore. Mar. 8, 2017). Railroad brought action against members of
county board of commissioners and Columbia River Gorge
Commission seeking declaration that Interstate Commerce
Commission Termination Act (ICCTA) preempted permitting
process imposed by county ordinance and that application of county
ordinance to prohibit railroad’s project to build new track violated
commerce clause. Environmental organizations intervened as
defendants. Indian tribes moved to dismiss with prejudice for failure
to join tribes as required party. The District Court held that:
(1) tribes were necessary party; (2) tribes’ interest in their treatyreserved fishing rights related to subject matter of railroad’s action,
as required to be necessary party; (3) tribes’ interest in their treatyreserved fishing rights would not be adequately represented by
defendants, as required to be necessary party; (4) joinder of tribes
was not feasible; (5) tribes were indispensable party, warranting
dismissal with prejudice; and (6) public rights exception did not
apply to preclude dismissal. Motion granted.
82.

Dahlstrom v. Sauk-Suiattle Indian Tribe

No. C16-0052JLR, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40654 (W.D. Wash.
Mar. 21, 2017). Before the court is Defendants Sauk-Suiattle Indian
Tribe of Washington (the Sauk-Suiattle or the Tribe), Community
Natural Medicine, PLLC (CNM), Christine Morlock, Robert
Morlock, and Ronda Metcalf’s (collectively Defendants) motion to
dismiss Plaintiff Raju Dahlstrom’s claims against them. On January
12, 2016, Mr. Dahlstrom filed a complaint under seal pursuant to the
qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C.
§§ 3729-33, and the Washington State Medical Fraud and False
Claims Act (MFFCA), RCW 74.66.005 et seq. The Sauk-Suiattle is
a federally recognized Native American tribe in Darrington,
Washington. CNM is a health clinic in Arlington, Washington,
owned by Dr. Morlock and Mr. Morlock. The complaint also lists
Dr. Morlock, Mr. Morlock, and Ms. Metcalf (collectively,
Individual Defendants), who is the Director of the Indian Health
Service (IHS) and the Health Clinic of the Sauk-Suiattle, as
defendants. The Sauk-Suiattle employed Mr. Dahlstrom from 2010
through his termination on December 8, 2015. The Tribe initially
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hired Mr. Dahlstrom as a Case Manager, but in April 2015, the Tribe
promoted him to Director. Mr. Dahlstrom alleges that Defendants
knowingly presented or caused to be presented false or fraudulent
claims to the United States — and by extension, the State of
Washington. The Sauk-Suiattle tribe is a federally recognized
Native American tribe. The Tribe is thus immune from Mr.
Dahlstrom’s qui tam FCA claims. Because the Sauk-Suiattle has
sovereign immunity with respect to Mr. Dahlstrom’s qui tam suit,
whether CNM is also immune depends on whether it “functions as
an arm of the tribe.” The court concludes that Defendants have not
met their burden of establishing that CNM is an arm of the tribe. The
court therefore denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss CNM on the
basis of sovereign immunity. Mr. Dahlstrom is suing Individual
Defendants in their individual capacities. Defendants argue that
Individual Defendants “were tribal employees or agents or officials
acting in their official tribal capacity.” Defendants argue that the
Tribe’s sovereign immunity, therefore, extends to Individual
Defendants. The court concludes that Individual Defendants are not
immune from suit due to sovereign immunity. Being fully advised,
the court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to
Mr. Dahlstrom’s claims against the Sauk-Suiattle but DENIES the
motion with respect to Mr. Dahlstrom’s claims against CNM, Dr.
Morlock, Mr. Morlock, and Ms. Metcalf.
83.

Lesperance v. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians

No. 2:16-cv-232, 2017 WL 1505329 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 27, 2017).
Plaintiff fell and hurt herself in a tribal store. She sued the Tribe in
tribal court and lost because the tribal court found that Plaintiff
failed to comply with the procedural requirements embedded in the
Tribal ordinance waiving sovereign immunity for injuries in public
buildings. Plaintiff then filed this federal action to overturn the
decision of the tribal court system. The Court has sympathy for
Plaintiff's position on the particulars of this record, but the Court has
no jurisdiction to overturn the Tribe's application of its own
sovereign immunity ordinance in its own tribal courts. Accordingly,
this matter is DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The Court takes no position on the merits of the Tribe's
interpretation and application of its own ordinance.
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84.

Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M. v. Barboan

No. 16-2050, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 9204 (10th Cir. May 26,
2017). HOLDINGS: (1) A public utility company was precluded
from condemning Indian tribal land for an easement for an electrical
transmission line since the statutory authority to condemn lands
previously allotted to individual Indians did not extend to tribal
lands which the United States held in trust for the tribe even if the
tribe reacquired the lands long after allotment; (2) Tribal lands
which were not subject to condemnation included lands in which the
tribe held any fractional interest since, when all or part of a parcel
of allotted land owned by one or more individual Indians was
transferred to the United States in trust for the tribe, that land became
tribal land not subject to condemnation. Order affirmed.
85.

Frank Ireson v. Avi Casino Enterprises, Inc.

No. 2:17-CV-987 JCM (VCF), 2017 WL 2960526 (D. Nev. Jul 10,
2017). Presently before the court is defendant AVI Casino
Enterprises, Inc., doing business as AVI Resort & Casino’s (AVI)
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The instant action
concerns a slip-and-fall incident in a Fort Mojave Tribe casino. On
April 8, 2015, AVI’s property was undergoing renovations. As a
result of those renovations, and AVI’s alleged negligence, Ireson
tripped on a piece of metal about two to three inches long sticking
out of the floor. As a result of fall, Ireson slammed against the
concrete floor, allegedly sustaining “significant and substantial
injuries upon his person requiring immediate medical care.” Ireson
required an ambulance to take him to the hospital. On June 29, 2015,
Ireson’s counsel sent a letter advising AVI of Ireson’s claim, to
which there was no reply. On December 16, 2016, a demand for
settlement was sent to AVI, at which time Ireson received a response
asserting he failed to comply with the Fort Mojave Indian Tribal
Tort Claims Ordinance. The instant action for negligence was filed
on April 6, 2017. In the instant motion, AVI asserts sovereign
immunity and moves to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). AVI
argues in its motion to dismiss that the casino “functions as an arm
of the tribe and is protected by tribal sovereign immunity.” Here,
AVI is a tribal corporation. AVI is a tribal corporation formed under
tribal law, is wholly-owned and operated by the Fort Mojave Tribe,
is governed by the tribal council, operates on tribal land, and its
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revenue is deposited into the tribal treasury. Ireson contends in his
response to AVI’s motion to dismiss that AVI’s “sovereign
immunity is not absolute under these facts” and that AVI has
implicitly waived its sovereign immunity. To support his argument,
Ireson relies on the “sue and be sued” clause in the tribal enabling
ordinance. The court disagrees as “the cited ordinance was repealed
and replaced.” The existence of a tribal procedure for the provision
of tort remedies is, itself, evidence that the tribe has not waived
sovereign immunity. Moreover, Ireson provides no legal basis for
the argument that failure to give notice of those tort remedies is
grounds for waiver of sovereign immunity. In light of the foregoing,
AVI’s motion to dismiss will be granted. Ireson’s complaint will be
dismissed without prejudice.
86.

Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v. Lewis Tein, P.L.

No. 3D16–2826, 227 So. 3d 656, 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 11442 (D.
Fla. Aug. 9, 2017). HOLDINGS: (1) A suit by an Indian Tribe’s
former lawyers against the Tribe alleging civil remedies for criminal
practices, § 772.103(3), Fla. Stat., and four counts of malicious
prosecution, was barred by the Tribe’s sovereign immunity; (2)
Although the Tribe had waived its immunity in a prior lawsuit for
the limited purpose of allowing questioning of a Tribe attorney
about documents he had produced, and had waived its immunity in
three prior suits against the attorneys, these waivers did not extend
to the lawyers’ suit; (3) The immunity waivers in the prior four cases
did not extend to subsequent litigation, even though the subsequent
case was related and arose out of the same facts; where the prior
litigation ended and the new case began was the point that the waiver
was unclear and not explicit. Trial court’s order reversed, and case
remanded for the trial court to grant the Tribe’s motion to dismiss.
87.

Stillaguamish Tribe of Indians v. Washington

No. 3:16-cv-05566-RJB, 2017 WL 3424942 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 9,
2017). This matter was before the Court on cross motions for
summary judgment filed by the defendants, State of Washington and
Robert W. Ferguson (the State) and the plaintiff, Stillaguamish
Tribe of Indians (the Tribe). The primary, and ultimately dispositive,
issue before the Court is the enforceability of a sovereign immunity
waiver in a contract, Salmon Project Agreement 04-1634, which
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was signed by Mr. Pat Stevenson, an employee and non-member of
the Tribe. Mr. Stevenson has been the Tribe’s Environmental
Engineer for approximately thirty years. Mr. Stevenson is not an
enrolled member of the Tribe and is therefore not eligible to be a
Director. Salmon Project Agreement No. 04-1634 sets out
contractual obligations of the Tribe and the Salmon Recovery
Funding Board (SRFB), the entity responsible for administering the
Salmon Funding Accounts for the State of Washington. In
consideration for a state grant of $497,000, the Tribe, referred to in
the agreement as the “Sponsor,” was to execute a project entitled,
“Steelhead Haven Landslide Remediation.” Two sections of
Salmon Project Agreement No. 04-1634 are pertinent to this case.
The indemnification clause, provides: To the fullest extent permitted
by the law, the Sponsor expressly agrees to and shall indemnify,
defend and hold harmless the State ... against all claims, actions,
costs, damages, or expenses of any nature arising out of or incident
to the Sponsor’s or any Contractor’s performance or failure to
perform the Agreement. Section 41 provides: Any judicial award,
determination, order, decree or other relief, whether in law or equity
or otherwise, resulting from the action shall be binding and
enforceable. Any money judgment against the Tribe, tribal officers
and members, or the State of Washington ... may not exceed the
amount provided for in Section F—Projecting Funding of the
Agreement. C. The Tribe hereby waives its sovereign immunity as
necessary to give effect to this section, and the State of Washington
has waived its immunity to suit in state court. These waivers are only
for the benefit of the Tribe and State and shall not be enforceable by
any third party[.] Mr. Stevenson managed the Steelhead Haven
Landslide Remediation project, which took several years to
complete, on behalf of the Tribe. In summary, by its own terms
Salmon Project Agreement 04/1635 clearly waives the Tribe’s
sovereign immunity, but the agreement is not binding on the Tribe.
The agreement was not entered into with the requisite authority,
because neither the Tribe’s constitution, prior policies and practices,
nor any resolution delegating the Board’s plenary waiver power
show an unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity. Therefore, on
the issue of waiving sovereign immunity, summary judgment should
be granted against the State and in favor of the Tribe. Because the
Court finds that the Tribe did not waive its sovereign immunity, the
Court does not reach the State’s equitable arguments.
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K.
88.

Sovereignty, Tribal Inherent
Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Colombe
(In re Estate of Colombe)

No. 27587, 2016 S.D. LEXIS 102, 2016 S.D. 62 (S.D. Aug. 31,
2016). An estate appealed from a circuit court’s decision to grant
comity to a Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court order. The order pierced a
business’s corporate veil and held decedent personally liable for a
judgment in favor of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe. Charles Colombe,
a member of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe (RST) died on June 9, 2013.
His son, Wesley Colombe, filed a petition for informal probate in
Todd County, Sixth Judicial Circuit, and was appointed as personal
representative of Charles’s estate (the Estate). In February 2014,
Wesley provided written notice to creditors. The RST filed a notice
of creditor’s claim, seeking to enforce an April 19, 2012, Rosebud
Sioux Tribal Court (Tribal Court) order and judgment for
$527,146.76. In response, Wesley filed a notice of disallowance of
claim, asserting the RST could not show that the order was entitled
to comity by satisfying the requirements of SDCL 1-1-25. The
circuit court granted comity to the tribal court order and judgment.
Wesley, on behalf of the Estate, appealed. The April 19, 2012,
tribal court judgment was the culmination of more than a decade of
steady litigation between RST and BBC Entertainment Inc. (BBC).
Aspects of the case have been reviewed by the Tribal Court, the
Rosebud Sioux Tribe Supreme Court (RST Supreme Court), the
federal district court, and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. The
circuit court did not err by granting comity to Judge Meyers’s
Tribal Court order pursuant to SDCL 1-1-25. Although not
specifically authorized by Article XI, §§ 2 and 4 of the RST
Constitution or RST Code § 9-1-5, Judge Meyers’s appointment
was authorized under RST Code § 4-2-8 as a long-standing tribal
practice. Moreover, the proceedings did not deprive Charles of due
process. He had several opportunities to appeal the Tribal Court
rulings to the RST Supreme Court and elected not to do so. The
enforcement of the Tribal Court judgment does not violate public
policy. Affirmed.

137

89.

Soldier v. Dougherty

No. CIV-16-958-M, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133506 (W.D. Okla.
Aug. 31, 2016). Petitioners, appearing with counsel, filed a Petition
for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The
matter was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for initial
proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). For the
following reasons, it is recommended that the Petition be dismissed
without prejudice upon filing. Petitioners GoodEagle and Easley
alleged that they were arrested at Iowa tribal headquarters on
August 19, 2016, and Petitioner Big Soldier alleged he was arrested
on the same date by a Lincoln County law enforcement officer at the
Lincoln County Jail, “when he went to see about posting bond” for
Petitioners GoodEagle and Easley. Petitioners state that they are
being detained in the Lincoln County Jail, “for allegedly violating
an Iowa tribal district court gag order by speaking to attorney Peggy
Big Eagle” concerning an Indian Child Welfare Act case pending in
that tribal court. Petitioners allege[d] that their arrest and detention
violate “tribal, state and federal Constitution and the Indian Child
Welfare Act.” Petitioners request “an immediate hearing for
petitioners to obtain their liberty,” service of process by the United
States Marshals Service, and a “reasonable attorney fee of $10,000
at $200/hour against defendants and each of them.” Respondents
named in the Petition include Dougherty, in his capacity as the
Sheriff of Lincoln County, Oklahoma. A federal court reviewing
such an action must first determine whether the petitioner has
exhausted tribal remedies. See Dry v. CFR Court of Indian Offenses
for the Choctaw Nation, 168 F.3d 1207, 1209 (10th Cir. 1999).
Thus, exhaustion of tribal remedies is generally required prior to
review in federal court of a habeas action challenging tribal court
proceedings. Petitioners assert[ed] that they have attempted to file,
through a representative, a “Motion to Set Aside the Permanent Gag
Order,” but that Respondent Rowe refused to file the Motion
because Petitioner’s representative was not a member of the tribal
bar although her application is pending. Petitioners assert[ed] that
they are being held in the Lincoln County Jail without any
documentation of the basis for their detention or means to obtain
their freedom, but Petitioners also acknowledge that “[t]ribal courts
commonly require cash bonds” and that they are aware they are
being detained for allegedly violating a tribal court order. Under
these circumstances, it does not appear that exhaustion of tribal
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remedies would be futile. Accordingly, the Petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 be dismissed without
prejudice for failure to exhaust tribal remedies.
90.

State v. Priest

Nos. 32221-1-III, 33704-9-III, 2016 Wash. App. LEXIS 2568
(Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2016). David Randall Priest sought, through a
personal restraint petition, relief from his convictions for possession
of a stolen motor vehicle and possession of stolen property in the
third degree. Priest contended that the superior court lacked
jurisdiction over him and the prosecution because he is an enrolled
member of the Confederated Tribes of the Colville Nation and any
crimes occurred solely on tribal land. Because the only evidence of
possession of stolen property showed the property to be on
reservation land, we hold that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
entertain the prosecution against David Priest. The appellate court
vacated his convictions, judgment, and sentence.
91.

Corp. of Latter Day Saints v. LK

No. 2:16-cv-00453-RJS-BCW, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159025 (D.
Utah Nov. 16, 2016). This case relates to lawsuits presently pending
before the Navajo Nation District Court. In those cases, Defendants
RJ, MM, BN, and LK (Doe Defendants) allege that they suffered
abuse years ago after Plaintiffs, the Corporation of the President of
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints and LDS Family
Services, placed them off-reservation with LDS families as part of
the Indian Student Placement Program (ISPP). In their Amended
Complaint, Plaintiffs here seek a declaration that the Navajo Nation
District Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the underlying cases,
and request an injunction prohibiting Doe Defendants from
proceeding with their cases in Tribal Court. Plaintiffs argue that the
Tribal Court clearly lacks jurisdiction over Doe Defendants’ claims,
and that this court should so find now, without requiring Plaintiffs
to exhaust their Tribal Court remedies by presenting their
jurisdictional arguments to the Tribal Court in the first instance.
Two motions are before the court: (1) Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Preliminary Injunction and (2) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Doe
Defendants filed three separate actions in the Navajo Nation District
Court, District of Window Rock, Arizona. In the cases before the
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Tribal Court, Doe Defendants allege injuries resulting from their
placement with LDS families while participating in the ISPP
between 1965 and 1983. The ISPP “continued for over forty years,
ending in approximately 1990, with tens of thousands of Navajo
Nation children having participated.” As part of the program, Doe
Defendants and their families agreed that Doe Defendants, who
were children at the time, would be placed during the school year in
homes of LDS Church members outside of the reservation to attend
public school. Doe Defendants allegedly suffered sexual abuse
while living with these families. Doe Defendants do not claim that
any of the sexual abuse at issue occurred on the reservation or on
property owned by the Navajo Tribe. At this stage of the case, the
court is required to accept the Plaintiffs’ allegations as true. The
court therefore accepts for purposes of deciding Doe Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss that none of the alleged abuse occurred on the
reservation, and that none of the placement decisions were made on
the reservation. Doe Defendants assert eight causes of action in their
Tribal Court cases: (1) childhood sexual abuse, (2) assault and
battery, (3) negligence, (4) negligent supervision/failure to warn,
(5) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (6) equitable relief,
(7) common law nuisance and request for injunctive relief, and
(8) violations of Navajo Common Law. Plaintiffs responded to Doe
Defendants’ Tribal Court complaints by filing this federal court
action. Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the Navajo Nation District
Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Doe Defendants’ lawsuits.
Plaintiffs also filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction asking this
court to enjoin Doe Defendants from proceeding with their cases in
Tribal Court. The court found that Plaintiffs failed at this stage in
the proceeding to meet their substantial burden of showing that
Tribal Court jurisdiction is clearly foreclosed. While it appears that
jurisdiction over certain claims — including those for direct liability
for the sexual assaults — may be foreclosed, it is not clear that Tribal
Court jurisdiction is clearly lacking for all of Doe Defendants’
claims. Because Plaintiffs request an injunction that would prevent
Doe Defendants from proceeding in Tribal Court on any of their
claims, it was Plaintiffs’ burden to show that all routes to jurisdiction
were clearly foreclosed. The court GRANTS Doe Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiffs must first exhaust their remedies in the
Tribal Court before seeking redress in this court. The case is
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dismissed without prejudice. The court DENIES as moot Plaintiffs’
Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
92.

Jimenez v. Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Cmty.
Council Mbrs

No. CV-16-00089-PHX-DJH, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172943 (D.
Ariz. Dec. 13, 2016). This matter is before the Court on Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff Raymond Jimenez,
a member of the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community
(SRPMIC), alleges in the Amended Complaint that on December
19, 2014, he received an order from the SRPMIC council members
that prohibits him from occupying certain Community buildings and
adjoining grounds without obtaining prior express permission.
Plaintiff alleges that this order is illegal and in violation of his due
process rights under the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) and the
SRPMIC Constitution. Plaintiff claims he was not charged with a
crime or arrested for the alleged “confrontational incidents” that
apparently formed the basis for the letter and order issued to
Plaintiff. In addition to the factual allegations, Plaintiff argues in the
Amended Complaint that the Defendants are not protected by
sovereign immunity. He further contends that the Ex Parte Young
doctrine authorizes a suit against officers of a sovereign government
where the plaintiff alleges continuing unlawful conduct and seeks
declaratory and injunctive relief only. For relief, Plaintiff requests
that the Court “restore [his] rights to be free” and his right to
employment, which Plaintiff claims has been blocked as a result of
the allegedly illegal order. Plaintiff further claims he “is not here for
money” but to enforce his due process rights. Also referenced in the
Amended Complaint is a decision by the SRPMIC Court after
Plaintiff filed an Emergency Motion raising the same claims he now
asserts here. In its Order dated January 30,2015, the SRPMIC Court
made factual findings regarding the content of the December 2014
letter/order issued to Plaintiff by the SRPMIC Council. The Order
also included conclusions of law regarding the jurisdiction of the
SRPMIC Court, in which the Court explained that its jurisdiction is
limited to certain types of disputes and does not encompass reviews
of Tribal Council actions or claims alleging violations of the
SRPMIC Constitution. The Court therefore concluded it lacked
jurisdiction to hear and determine the merits of Plaintiff s claims.
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The Court also pointed out that Plaintiff did not challenge the order
with the Tribal Council itself, even though the letter that
accompanied the order invited Plaintiff to provide written reasons if
he believed the order should be rescinded. Defendants argue that the
doctrine of sovereign immunity bars Plaintiffs claims. In addition,
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs claim under the ICRA fails as a
matter of law because Plaintiff is not seeking habeas corpus relief,
which is the only remedy the ICRA allows. The Court found that
Plaintiff does not allege that SRPMIC waived its sovereign
immunity, or that Congress authorized a suit against the tribe or its
council members under the circumstances presented here. Plaintiff
therefore failed to establish any basis to override SRPMIC’s
sovereign immunity. Consequently, this action must be dismissed.
Accordingly, IT IS HERE BY ORDERD that Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss Amended Complaint is GRANTED.
93. Mullally v. Gordon
No. 13-55152, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 22506 (9th Cir. Dec. 19,
2016). HOLDINGS: (1) The Chemehuevi Indian Tribe’s tribal court
entered judgment on the former manager’s defamation and
conversion claims; (2) The district court did not err by recognizing
the tribal court’s judgment under principles of comity; (3) The tribal
court had both personal and subject matter jurisdiction over the
manager’s defamation and conversion claims; (4) The manager was
afforded due process by the tribal court; (5) His claims were
reviewed by two separate tribal bodies; (6) The district court did not
err by dismissing his intentional misrepresentation and promissory
fraud claims or by granting summary judgment as to his intentional
interference with contractual relations claim. Judgment affirmed.
94.

People ex rel. Owen v. Miami Nation Enterprises

No. S216878, 2016 WL 7407327 (Cal. Dec. 22, 2016). The People
brought action against five payday lenders for injunctive relief,
restitution, and civil penalties for violations of the of the Deferred
Deposit Transaction Law (DDTL). Two lenders controlled by
Indian tribes specially appeared and moved to quash service of
summons. The Superior Court, Los Angeles County, denied motion.
The Supreme Court granted review, superseding the opinion of the
Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court held that: (1) entity asserting
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tribal immunity bears the burden of showing by a preponderance of
the evidence that it is an “arm of the tribe”; (2) when determining
whether an entity is an “arm of the tribe” entitled to tribal immunity,
courts should apply a five-factor test that considers (1) the entity’s
method of creation, (2) whether the tribe intended the entity to share
in its immunity, (3) the entity’s purpose, (4) the tribe’s control over
the entity, and (5) the financial relationship between the tribe and
the entity; abrogating Trudgeon v. Fantasy Springs Casino, 71 Cal.
App. 4th 632, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 65, Redding Rancheria v. Superior
Court, 88 Cal. App. 4th 384, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 773, and American
Property Management Corp. v. Superior Court, 206 Cal. App. 4th
491, 141 Cal. Rptr. 3d 802; and (3) lenders did not have immunity
under the “arm of the tribe” doctrine. Reversed and remanded.
95.

Knighton v. Cedarville Rancheria of Northern Paiute
Indians

No. 16-cv-02438-WHO, 2017 WL 616465 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 15,
2017). Plaintiff Duanna Knighton, the former Tribal Administrator
for defendant Cedarville Rancheria of Northern Paiute Indians (the
Tribe), seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against the Tribe,
Cedarville Rancheria Tribal Court (Tribal Court), and Tribal Court
Judge Patricia R. Lenzi (Tribal Judge Lenzi) (collectively
defendants) to avoid Tribal Court jurisdiction over claims that she
defrauded the Tribe and breached her fiduciary duties to it.
Defendants move to dismiss Knighton’s complaint because the
Tribal Court has jurisdiction. I agree that it has both regulatory and
adjudicative authority over its former employee under the facts
alleged; accordingly, it has subject matter jurisdiction. Defendants’
motion is GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE.
96.

Acres v. Blue Lake Rancheria

No. 16-cv-05391-WHO, 2017 WL 733114 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24,
2017). Plaintiff James Acres seeks declaratory and injunctive relief
against the Blue Lake Rancheria Tribe (Tribe), the Blue Lake
Rancheria Tribal Court (Tribal Court) and its Chief Judge, Lester
Marston, alleging that the Tribal Court has conducted itself in bad
faith in asserting jurisdiction over him in an underlying contractual
fraud case because Judge Marston refused to recuse himself from
the case and misrepresented his relationship with the Tribe. Judge
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Marston has now recused himself from the Tribal Court case and
appointed the Hon. James Lambden, a retired California Court of
Appeal Justice with no prior connection to the Tribe, to preside over
the matter. Given Judge Marston’s recusal and the appointment of a
neutral judge, there is insufficient evidence of bad faith for the
exception to apply. Acres does not meet any of the exceptions to the
exhaustion requirement. He must exhaust his tribal remedies before
bringing an action of this kind in federal court. The Tribe’s motion
to dismiss is GRANTED.
97. French v. Starr
No. 15-15470, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 9690 (9th Cir. Jun. 1, 2017).
Plaintiff Roger French appeals the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Defendants, who are members of the Tribal
Court and Tribal Council of the Colorado River Indian Tribes
(CRIT). French argues CRIT lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate
eviction proceedings relating to his leasehold (the Permit) on the
California side of the Colorado River (the Western Boundary lands)
because French’s lot is not part of the Colorado River Indian
Reservation. Both the Permit and the assignment of that Permit to
French described the lot in question as within the Colorado River
Indian Reservation. French paid rent pursuant to the Permit, first to
the Bureau of Indian Affairs for the benefit of CRIT and then
directly to CRIT, from 1983 through 1993. French is therefore
estopped from contesting CRIT’s title. See Richardson v. Van
Dolah, 429 F.2d 912, 917 (9th Cir. 1970), Goode v. Gaines, 145
U.S. 141, 152, 12 S. Ct. 839, 36 L. Ed. 654 (1892) (estoppel does
not depend on validity of landlord’s title), Williams v. Morris, 95
U.S. 444, 455, 24 L. Ed. 360 (1877) (when tenant gains possession,
tenant is estopped from denying title of landlord). Once French’s
challenge to CRIT’s title is resolved, this case is squarely controlled
by Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc. v. La Rance, 642
F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 2011) (CRIT properly exercised jurisdiction over
an unlawful detainer action for breach of lease by a non-tribal
member within the Western Boundary lands). AFFIRMED.
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98.

Norton v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray
Reservation

No. 15-4170, 862 F.3d 1236, 2017 WL 2952256 (10th Cir. Jul. 11,
2017). Nonmember police officers brought action against Indian
tribe, its business committee, tribal court, acting chief judge of tribal
court, and parents of person killed by officers, seeking to halt
allegedly unlawful exercise of tribal court jurisdiction over
underlying action that was brought against them by tribe, decedent’s
estate, and parents alleging wrongful death, trespass, and other torts.
The United States District Court for the District of Utah, No. 2:15CV-00300, denied defendants’ motions to dismiss, and granted
officers’ motion for preliminary injunction. Defendants appealed.
The Court of Appeals held that: (1) tribe’s trespass claim fell within
jurisdiction of tribal court under Montana v. United States exception
to principle that tribe generally lacked authority to regulate
nonmember conduct; (2) tribe’s trespass claim fairly could be called
catastrophic for tribal self-government, as required to fall within
jurisdiction of tribal court under Montana v. United States
exception; (3) tribal exhaustion was not required for claims against
nonmember police officers alleging false imprisonment, false arrest,
assault and battery, wrongful death, spoliation of evidence, and
conspiracy; (4) state interest was not implicated by nonmember state
police officers pursuing Indian tribe member on tribal land for onreservation offense, and thus tribal jurisdiction was not barred over
trespass claim against officers; (5) bad faith exception from
exhaustion of available tribal court remedies was not available as to
trespass claim against nonmember police officers; (6) Ex parte
Young exception to sovereign immunity applied to tribal official,
sued in his official capacity, in suit seeking to halt allegedly
unlawful exercise of tribal court jurisdiction; and (7) tribe, its
business committee, and tribal court were not subject to Ex parte
Young exception, and thus were entitled to tribal sovereign
immunity. Vacated and remanded.
99.

Bishop Paiute Tribe v. Inyo County

No. 15-16604, 863 F.3d 1144, 2017 WL 3044643 (9th Cir. Jul. 19,
2017). Indian Tribe brought action against county, sheriff, and
county district attorney, following arrest of Tribal police officer,
seeking declaration that Tribe had right to investigate violations of
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tribal, state, and federal law, and to detain and transport or deliver a
non-Indian violator encountered on the reservation to the proper
authorities, and seeking injunction prohibiting defendants from
arresting, criminally charging, interfering with, or threatening tribal
police department officers who exercised their lawful duties. The
United States District Court for the Eastern District of California,
No. 1:15-00367, 2015 WL 4203986, dismissed. Tribe appealed. The
Court of Appeals held that: (1) district court’s order dismissing
Tribe’s action for lack of jurisdiction was final appealable order;
(2) Tribe adequately pleaded federal question; (3) Indian Law
Enforcement Reform Act (ILERA) did not displace federal common
law upon which Tribe’s complaint relied; (4) Tribe had standing to
bring action; (5) action was ripe; and (6) action was not mooted by
Tribe’s letter responding to county sheriff’s cease and desist letter.
Reversed and remanded.
L.

Tax

100. City of Snoqualmie v. King County Exec. Dow Constantine
No. 91534-2, 2016 Wash. LEXIS 1376 (Wash. Dec. 22, 2016). The
City of Snoqualmie challenged the validity of state legislation
authorizing Indian tribes to make payments to the State in lieu of the
State’s taxing their property. The city claimed that payments made
in lieu of taxation are themselves taxes that violate constitutional
provisions requiring uniformity of taxation, prohibiting the State
from surrendering its power to tax, and specifying the circumstances
when the legislature may delegate its taxing authority. The Superior
Court on March 4, 2015, granted partial summary judgment in favor
of the City, ruling that the City had standing to challenge the
constitutionality of the legislation and that payment in lieu of
taxation under the legislation was a property tax that violated
constitutional requirements and prohibitions. The Supreme Court,
held that (1) The tribe’s payment in lieu of tax (PILT) was not a tax
at all, but rather, a charge that tribes paid to compensate
municipalities for public services provided to the exempt property;
(2) Because the PILT was not a tax, it was not subject to Wash.
Const. art. VII’s tax requirements and thus, the trial court’s
judgment was improper; (3) The city had standing to challenge the
PILT, both on its own behalf and in the form of representative
standing on behalf of its residents; (4) The PILT’s purpose was to
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allow the tribe to alleviate a burden to which it contributed; (5) The
PILT was meant to offset the burden created by the tax exemption,
in order to compensate the municipality for the services the tribal
exempt land required. Judgment reversed.
101. Tulalip Tribes v. Washington
No. 2:15-cv-00940, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1646 (W.D. Wash.
Jan. 5, 2017). Before the Court was Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment, Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment Regarding Government Services Provided Outside the
Boundaries of Quil Ceda Village, and Plaintiff-Intervenor’s Motion
for Order Regarding Government Services. As alleged in the
Complaint, Plaintiff Tulalip Tribes is a federally-recognized Indian
tribal government, and the Consolidated Borough of Quil Ceda
Village (Village) is a political subdivision of the Tulalip Tribes.
Together, Tulalip and the Village are suing the State of Washington
and Snohomish County, along with state and county officials, for
declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, Plaintiffs challenge
three taxes imposed by the State of Washington and Snohomish
County on non-Indian businesses and their patrons within the
boundaries of Quil Ceda Village: retail sales and use taxes, Wash.
Rev. Code §§ 82.08, 82.12, 82.14; business and occupation taxes,
Wash. Rev. Code § 82.04; and personal property taxes, Wash. Rev.
Code § 84. Plaintiffs’ in their complaint sets forth three grounds for
the illegality of the taxes. First, they allege the taxes violate the
Indian Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. Second,
they allege the taxes are preempted by federal law. And third, they
allege the taxes interfere with Tulalip’s tribal sovereignty. The
United States intervened as an additional plaintiff and alleged the
same three counts. In their motion for summary judgment,
Defendants argue that the Indian Commerce Clause does not bar the
taxes at issue; Congress has not preempted the taxes at issue, which
can be determined without a fact-intensive inquiry; and the taxes do
not violate Tulalip’s tribal sovereignty. Plaintiffs, including the
United States, move for an order that government services provided
outside the Village and not directly supporting commerce in the
Village have no legal effect for this action. The Court GRANT[ED]
in part and DENIE[D] in part Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment. The Motion was GRANTED as to Count I and denied as
to Counts II and III. The Court DENIE[D] Plaintiffs’ and Plaintiff-
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Intervenor’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding
Government Services.
102. Desert Water Agency v. United States Department of the
Interior
No. 14-55461, 2017 WL 894462, 849 F.3d 1250 (9th Cir. Mar. 7,
2017). Political subdivision of the State of California brought action
under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) against the United
States Department of the Interior and its Bureau of Indian Affairs
(BIA), challenging a federal regulation that the subdivision believed
might preempt certain taxes and fees the subdivision assessed
against non-Indians who leased lands within an Indian reservation.
The United States District Court for the Central District of
California, No. 5:13-cv-00606, dismissed action for lack of
standing. Subdivision appealed. The Court of Appeals, held that
federal regulation did not preempt taxes and fees that political
subdivision assessed against non-Indians who leased lands within
an Indian reservation, and thus subdivision lacked standing to
challenge the regulation. Affirmed.
103. Cougar Den, Inc., a Yakama Nation corporation,
Respondent, v. Washington State Department Of
Licensing, Appellant
No. 92289-6, 392 P.3d 1014, 2017 WL 1192119 (Wash. Mar. 16,
2017). The issue in this case centers on the interpretation of the
“right to travel” provision in Article III of the Yakama Nation Treaty
of 1855, 12 Stat. 951, 952-53 (1855), in the context of importing
fuel into Washington State. The Washington State Department of
Licensing (Department) challenges Cougar Den Inc.’s importation
of fuel without holding an importer’s license and without paying
state fuel taxes under former chapter 82.36 RCW, repealed by
LAWS OF 2013, ch. 225, § 501, and former chapter 82.38 RCW
(2007). Cougar Den is a Confederated Tribes and Bands of the
Yakama Nation (Yakama Nation) corporation that transports fuel
from Oregon to the Yakama Indian Reservation, where it is sold.
Kip Ramsey, Cougar Den’s owner and president, is an enrolled
member of the Yakama Nation. Cougar Den began transporting fuel
in 2013 from Oregon to the Yakama Indian Reservation. Cougar
Den contracted with KAG West, a trucking company, to transport

148

the fuel into Washington from March 2013 to October 2013. On
December 9, 2013, the Department issued assessment number 756M
against Cougar Den, demanding $3.6 million in unpaid taxes,
penalties, and licensing fees for hauling the fuel across state lines.
Cougar Den appealed the assessment to the Department’s ALJ, who
held in his initial order that the assessment was an impermissible
restriction under the treaty. Upon review, the director of the
Department reversed the ALJ and entered findings of fact and
conclusions of law. Cougar Den then petitioned for review of the
final order by the Department. The Yakima County Superior Court,
sitting in an appellate capacity, reversed the director’s order and
held that the taxation violated the tribe’s right to travel. The
Department appealed the superior court’s decision and sought direct
review under RAP 4.2(a)(2). The Supreme Court granted direct
review and affirmed.
104. New York v. United Parcel Service, Inc.
No. 15–1136, 2017 WL 1135257, 253 F. Supp. 3d 583 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 24, 2017),
Opinion
Corrected and Superseded,
2017 WL 2305380 (May 25, 2017). This lawsuit concerns a nontribal member, United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS), which allegedly
transported, inter alia, cigarettes from and between New York State
Indian reservations for a number of shippers (Relevant Shippers).
Plaintiffs, the State of New York and the City of New York
(collectively, plaintiffs, and, respectively, the State and/or the City),
assert that in transporting unstamped (and therefore untaxed)
cigarettes, UPS has violated an Assurance of Discontinuance (AOD)
it signed with the State in 2005, as well as New York Executive Law
(NY. Exec. Law) § 63(12); New York Public Health Law (PHL)
§ 1399-ll; the Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking Act (“PACT Act”),
15 U.S.C. §§375-78; the Contraband Cigarettes Trafficking Act
(CCTA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2341-46; and the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68.3. UPS
has disputed that it ever violated its obligations under the AOD or
knowingly transported unstamped cigarettes from or between Indian
reservations to unauthorized recipients. The Court found that UPS
violated its obligations under the AOD in a number of respects and,
in addition, knowingly transported cigarettes from and between
Indian reservations for all but one of the shippers (the Liability
Shippers). For this reason and others, UPS’s arguments against any
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liability fail. The Court finds that plaintiffs are entitled to
compensatory damages as well as monetary penalties in amounts yet
to be determined, but not injunctive relief or the appointment of a
monitor.
105. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue
No. 11, 2017 WL 1278708, 148 T.C. Tax Ct. Rep. Dec. (RIA)
148.11 (U.S. Tax Ct. Apr. 5, 2017). This is a worker classification
case about hundreds of workers whom their employer – an Indian
tribe – called independent contractors but whom the Commissioner
called employees. The Mescalero Apache Tribe has moved to
compel discovery of the IRS's records of those workers. During the
2009-11 tax years the Tribe either employed or contracted with
several hundred workers. During each of these years the Tribe
timely issued Forms W-2 to its employees, and Forms 1099 to its
contractors. This case began when the Commissioner audited the
Tribe on suspicion that some of the workers classified as contractors
were really employees. Reclassification would make the Tribe liable
for taxes for its workers whom it improperly labeled as contractors.
But it sees a way out: Section 3402 lets an employer in this situation
escape tax liability if it can show the workers whom it labeled
independent contractors paid income tax on their earnings. One way
to do this would be for the Tribe to ask each worker to complete
Form 4669, Statement of Payments Received. The Tribe tried to do
that, but it was only partly successful because many of the Tribe's
former workers have moved, and some live in hard-to-reach areas
where they lack cell-phone service and even basic utilities. The
Tribe wants the IRS to search the records of those 70 workers to
determine whether they reported their Form 1099 income and paid
their tax liabilities and then to adjust the Tribe's liability
accordingly. The Tribe's current motion to compel discovery—this
time in compliance with our rules—asks that we decide an issue that
it turns out we have not yet analyzed in any opinion: Can an
employer take discovery of its workers' IRS records to reduce its
own tax liability under section 3402? The Commissioner objects,
claiming that this is barred under section 6103 and that it amounts
to a prohibited shift of the burden of proof from the Tribe to the
Commissioner. We hold that the Tribe's workers' return information
is disclosable under section 6103(h)(4)(C). Because the Tribe seeks
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information that is both disclosable and discoverable, we hold for
the Tribe.
106. Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Seneca County, New
York
No. 11-CV-6004 CJS, 2017 WL 1653026 (W.D.N.Y. May 2, 2017).
This action challenges Seneca County’s ability to impose and collect
ad valorem property taxes on parcels of real estate owned by the
Cayuga Indian Nation of New York. The Cayuga Nation contends
both that Seneca County cannot impose the property taxes, because
the subject properties are “located within an Indian reservation,” and
cannot sue to collect the taxes, because the Cayuga Indian Nation
enjoys sovereign immunity from suit. Now before the Court is the
Cayuga Nation’s motion to dismiss Seneca County’s counterclaim,
which seeks a declaratory judgment that the subject properties,
which the Cayugas ostensibly sold two centuries ago and then
recently re-purchased, “are not now an Indian reservation for
purposes of New York Real Property Tax Law § 454 or Indian Law
§ 6 or [‘]Indian Country[‘] for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 1151.” In
recent years, the Cayuga Nation purchased at least five parcels of
land in Seneca County, within the same geographic area as the
Cayuga Indian Reservation that was established in 1789. Seneca
County imposed property taxes on the Cayuga-owned properties,
but the Cayuga Nation refused to pay the taxes. Thereafter, Seneca
County initiated tax foreclosure proceedings against the Cayuga
Nation. In response to those foreclosure lawsuits, the Cayuga Nation
commenced this lawsuit. The Cayugas’ pleading seeks two types of
relief. First, the Amended Complaint seeks a declaration that the
County cannot foreclose on, or otherwise “acquire, convey, sell or
transfer title” to, “Nation-owned properties” within Seneca County.
Second, the Amended Complaint seeks an injunction, prohibiting
the County from making “any further efforts” to foreclose on,
acquire, convey or otherwise sell “Nation-owned properties in
Seneca County;” prohibiting the County from “interfering in any
way with the Nation’s ownership, possession, and occupancy of
such lands.” Plaintiff’s application to dismiss Defendant’s
counterclaim is granted, with prejudice.
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107. Ho-Chunk, Inc. v. Sessions
16–cv–01652 (CRC), 2017 WL 2274940 (D.D.C. May 24, 2017).
Tribal-owned corporations engaged in distribution of cigarettes
brought action against the Attorney General of the United States,
seeking declaration clarifying whether certain recordkeeping
requirements of the Contraband Cigarettes Trafficking Act (CCTA)
applied to Indian tribal entities. Defendant moved for summary
judgment. The District Court held that: (1) CCTA’s recordkeeping
requirements applied to Indian tribal entities, and (2) tribal
governments, and thus tribal-owned entities, were “persons” within
meaning of CCTA and fell within scope of the Act. Motion granted.
108. Perkins v. United States
No. ORDER 16-CV-495, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123543
(W.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2017). This case presents what appears to be an
issue of first impression: whether a treaty between the United States
and Native Americans ensuring the free use and enjoyment of tribal
land bars taxes on income derived directly from the land—here, the
sale of gravel mined on the land. Although at least two circuit courts
have suggested in dicta that “income derived directly from the land”
might be exempt from taxation under such treaties, they did so to
distinguish that scenario from cases where an exemption was sought
for income earned in ways that do not relate to the land itself. See
Lazore v. Comm’r, 11 F.3d 1180 (3d Cir. 1993); Hoptowit v.
Comm’r, 709 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1983). And for the reasons that
follow, this Court finds that the plaintiffs have plausibly stated a
claim for relief under two treaties with the Native American Seneca
Nation. On June 16, 2016, Fredrick and Alice Perkins commenced
this action against the United States. The plaintiffs, one of whom is
“an enrolled member of the Seneca Nation,” removed gravel, with
permission, from the Seneca Nation Allegany Territory and later
sold it. After receiving a “notice of deficiency” from the Internal
Revenue Service, the plaintiffs paid taxes on the income from the
sale. In the amended complaint, they alleged that they are owed a
tax refund, interest, and penalties —totaling $9,863.68—because
their income from the sale of gravel is not taxable under the Treaty
with the Six Nations at Canandaigua of November 11, 1794
(Canandaigua Treaty), and the Treaty with the Seneca of May 20,
1842 (1842 Treaty). The United States has moved to dismiss the
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amended complaint. On September 16, 2016, this Court referred this
action to Magistrate Judge Hugh B. Scott. The Court adopted the
recommendation of Judge Scott regarding the claims under the
Canandaigua Treaty but rejected the recommendation regarding the
claims under the 1842 Treaty. Accordingly, the government’s
Motion to Dismiss [was] denied.
M.

Trust Breach and Claims

109. Marcia W. Davilla, et al. v. Enable Midstream
Partners, L.P., et al.
No. CIV-15-1262, 2017 WL 1169710 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 28, 2017).
Before the Court is plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on Liability for Their Trespass Claim and for a Permanent
Injunction. Defendants are the owner and operator of a network of
natural gas transmission pipelines across Oklahoma. Defendants’
transmission pipeline crosses an approximate 137-acre tract of land
in Caddo County, Oklahoma, which had originally been an Indian
allotment to Millie Oheltoint (Emaugobah), held in trust by the
United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs
(BIA). Thirty-eight (38) Indians and the Kiowa Indian Tribe of
Oklahoma (Kiowa Tribe) own undivided interests in the tract,
varying from 28.6% down to less than .9%. The original right of
way expired on November 20, 2000. On or about June 14, 2002,
defendants’ predecessor-in-interest, Enogex, Inc. (Enogex),
submitted a right-of-way offer to the BIA and made an offer to
plaintiffs for a new twenty-year easement, which was rejected by a
majority of the landowners. Despite the rejection by a majority of
the landowners, on June 23, 2008, the Interim Superintendent of the
BIA’s Anadarko Agency approved Enogex’s application for the
renewal of the right-of-way easement for twenty years. Plaintiffs
appealed the Interim Superintendent’s decision, and on March 23,
2010, the BIA vacated the interim superintendent’s decision. The
BIA determined that it did not have authority to approve the rightof-way without the consent of plaintiffs or their predecessors in
interest and that the price offered by defendants was unreasonable.
The BIA remanded the case for further negotiation and instructed
that if approval of a right-of-way was not timely secured that Enogex
should be directed to move the pipeline. A new right-of-way has not
been granted, and defendants have continued to operate the natural
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gas pipeline. The Court finds defendants’ continuing trespass on
plaintiffs’ property is clearly not unintentional. Additionally,
plaintiffs have objected to the renewal of the easement and
defendants continued use of the pipeline from the time defendants
first sought the renewal of the easement. Accordingly, the Court
finds that in light of their continuing trespass, defendants should be
permanently enjoined from using the pipeline under the tract at issue
and should be required to move the pipeline within six (6) months
of the date of this Order.
110. Fletcher v. United States
No. 16-5050, 2017 WL 1419010, 854 F.3d 1201 (10th Cir. Apr. 21,
2017). Tribal members brought class action against federal
government, seeking an accounting to determine whether the federal
government had fulfilled the fiduciary obligations it chose to assume
as trustee to oversee the collection of royalty income from oil and
gas reserves and its distribution to tribal members. The United States
District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, 2012 WL
1109090, dismissed the tribal members' claims, and they appealed.
The Court of Appeals, 730 F.3d 1206, reversed and remanded. On
remand, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Oklahoma, 153 F. Supp. 3d 1354, D.C. No. 4:02-CV-00427, ordered
government to provide an accounting. Tribal members appealed.
The Court of Appeals held that: (1) district court did not abuse its
discretion in setting time period of accounting, and (2) district court
did not abuse its discretion when it fashioned scope of accounting.
Affirmed.
111. Napoles, et al. v. Rogers, et al.
No. 16-cv-01933, 2017 WL 2930852 (E.D. Cal. Jul, 10, 2017). On
December 27, 2016, petitioners in this action filed a petition for writ
of habeas corpus pursuant to the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C.
§ 1303. On January 28, 2017, they filed an amended petition which
is now the operative pleading in this case. On May 5, 2017,
respondents Poncho, Rogers, Romero, Vega, and Williams
(collectively, the Tribal Council respondents) and respondent
Kockenmeister, a tribal court judge, separately moved to dismiss the
amended petition. At the core of this case is an intra-tribal dispute
regarding the ownership of certain parcels of land on the Bishop
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Paiute Reservation located in eastern California. The amended
petition alleges petitioners were unlawfully detained by respondents
when they were denied access to their family land and were cited for
trespass when attempting to enter the disputed land. Respondents
represent that the citations issued to petitioners are purely civil in
nature, and that petitioners can only be fined and not incarcerated
pursuant to those citations. On May 5, 2017, the same day
petitioners moved to stay these proceedings, respondents moved to
dismiss the petition for habeas relief now pending before this court.
Because the court concludes that petitioners have not been subjected
to “detention” within the meaning of § 1303, it lacks jurisdiction
over this habeas action. Respondents’ motions to dismiss the
pending petition for a writ of habeas corpus are granted, and the writ
of habeas corpus is dismissed.
N.

Miscellaneous

112. Navajo Nation Human Rights Comm’n v. San Juan Cnty.
No. 2:16-cv-00154-JNP-BCW, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143454 (D.
Utah Oct. 14, 2016). Before the court is a Motion for Preliminary
Injunction filed by Plaintiff Navajo Human Rights Commission and
others against Defendants San Juan County, John David Nelson,
Phil Lyman, Bruce Adams, and Rebecca Benally. Plaintiffs alleged
that San Juan County’s voting procedures violate the Voting Rights
Act. Plaintiffs brought the Preliminary Injunction Motion,
requesting that the court require the County to implement new
voting procedures before the November 2016 general election. San
Juan County is a sparsely populated and geographically vast
political subdivision of the State of Utah, occupying the state’s
southeastern corner. The County’s southern boundaries encompass
a large section of the federally established Navajo Reservation. As
a result, approximately half of the County’s residents are members
of the Navajo Nation. Most of the County’s Navajo residents live
within the boundaries of the Reservation. This motion for
preliminary injunction comes before the court in the context of a
lawsuit initiated by the Navajo Human Rights Commission and
several named plaintiffs who allege that the voting procedures in
place in San Juan County violate the Voting Rights Act. The voting
procedures at issue here span several years of elections. Prior to
2014, the County conducted elections through nine polling places
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open on Election Day. Each polling place provided some form of
language assistance to Navajo-speaking voters. In 2014, the County
transitioned to a predominantly mail-in voting system, leaving a
single physical polling location operating at the County Clerk’s
office in Monticello, Utah. Ballots were distributed to voters
through available mailing addresses approximately one month prior
to Election Day. This system was in place for the 2014 election
cycle. During 2014 and early in 2015, the Navajo Nation and the
Navajo Human Rights Commission officially opposed the mail-in
system, asserting that the closure of polling locations and switch to
mailed ballots burdened rural Navajo voters. The Commission filed
the Complaint underlying this Motion on February 25, 2016,
alleging that the mail-in ballot system violated the Voting Rights
Act and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Shortly thereafter, Defendants filed their Answer,
which asserted that the County was making significant changes to
its election procedures in anticipation of the June 2016 primary
elections. For the June 2016 elections, the County maintained the
predominantly mail-in voting system, but also opened three physical
polling locations on the Navajo Reservation and provided language
assistance to voters through Navajo-speaking translators on Election
Day. On August 3, 2016, Plaintiffs filed the Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, asserting that whether the County employed the 2014
mail-in voting system or the June 2016 procedures, the elections to
be held in November 2016 would violate Sections 2 and 203 of the
Voting Rights Act. Defendants filed a Memorandum in Opposition
to the Motion. The court concludes that Plaintiffs’ motion for
preliminary injunction should be denied. It is so ordered.
113. Navajo Nation, et al. v. San Juan County, a Utah
governmental subdivision
No. 2:12-00039, 2017 WL 3016782 (D. Utah Jul. 14, 2017).
Plaintiffs, Navajo Nation and several individual tribe members
(Navajo Nation), sued Defendant San Juan County, claiming the
County Commission and School Board election districts violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Fifteenth Amendment, and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act,
42 U.S.C. § 1973. The court previously found both sets of districts
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. The court did
not decide whether the School Board or County Commission
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districts violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The court then
outlined a process for adopting legally sound remedial districts. The
court suggested it would adopt San Juan County’s proposed
remedial plans if they cured the identified violations and were
otherwise legally sound. San Juan County’s remedial plans fail to
pass constitutional muster. Specifically, the court concludes race
was the predominant factor in the development of District 3 of the
School Board plan and Districts 1 and 2 of the County Commission
plan. The County’s consideration of race requires strict scrutiny
analysis of these districts. The court concludes the County has failed
to satisfy strict scrutiny and, therefore, these districts are
unconstitutional. Taking account of “what is necessary, what is fair,
and what is workable” given the circumstances of this case, the court
concludes the new districts must be a product of an independent,
neutral process, with ample opportunity for participation and
feedback from the parties. For these reasons, the court declines to
evaluate the proposed remedial plans submitted by Navajo Nation.
It will instead appoint a special master to assist the court in
formulating lawful remedial districts. SO ORDERED.
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